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Abstract. Distributed systems and applications require efficient and effective
techniques (e.g. self-(re)configuration, self-healing, etc.) for ensuring safety, se-
curity and more generally dependability properties, as well as convergence. The
complexity of these systems is increased by features like dynamic (changing)
topology, interconnection of heterogeneous components or failures detection. This
paper presents a methodology for verifying protocols and satisfying safety and
convergence requirements of the distributed self-⋆ systems. The self-⋆ systems are
based on the idea of managing complex infrastructures, software, and distributed
systems, with or without minimal user interactions. Correct-by-construction and
service-as-event paradigms are used for formalizing the system requirements,
where the formalization process is based on incremental refinement in EVENT
B. Moreover, this paper describes a fully mechanized proof of correctness of
the self-⋆ systems along with an interesting case study related to the P2P-based
self-healing protocol.
Keywords: Distributed systems, self-⋆, self-healing, self-stabilization, P2P, EVENT
B, liveness, service-as-event
1 Introduction
Nowadays, our daily lives are affected by various advanced technologies including
computers, chips, and smart-phones. These technologies are integrated into distributed
systems with different types of complexities like mobility, heterogeneity, security, fault-
tolerance, and dependability. Distributed systems are largely used in many applications
and provide required functionalities from the interactions between a large collection
of possibly heterogeneous and mobile components (nodes and/or agents). Within the
domain of distributed computing, there is an increasing interest in the self-stabilizing
systems, which are able to autonomically recover from occurring the faults [7]. The
autonomous property of the self-⋆ systems tends to take a growing importance in the
analysis and development of distributed systems. It is an imperative that we need to get
a better understanding of the self-⋆ systems (emergent behaviours, interactions between
agents, etc.), if we want to reason about their security, correctness and trustworthiness.
⋆ The current report is the companion paper of the paper [4] accepted for publication in the
volume 8477 of the serie Lecture Notes in Computer Science. The Event-B models are available
at the link http://eb2all.loria.fr. Processed on July 3, 2014.
Fortunately, the formal methods community has been analysing a similar class of systems
for years, namely distributed algorithms.
In this study, we use the correct by construction approach [12] for modelling the
distributed self-⋆ systems. Moreover, we also emphasize the use of the service-as-
event [3] paradigm, that identifies the phases of self-stabilization mechanism, which can



















Fig. 1: Diagram for a Self-
Stabilizing System S
We consider that a given system S (see in Fig.1) is char-
acterized by a set of events (procedures modelling either
phases or basic actions according to an abstraction level)
that modifies the state of the system. Legal states (correct
states) satisfying a safety property P are defined by a sub-
set CL of possible events of the system S . The events of
CL represent the possible big or small computation steps
of the system S and introduce the notion of closure [5],
where any computation starting from a legal state satis-
fying the property P leads to another legal state that also
satisfies the property P. The occurrence of a fault f leads
the system S into an illegal state (incorrect state), which
violates the property P. The fault f is defined as an
event f that belongs to a subset F of events. When considering the hypothesis of having
a self-⋆ system, we assume that there are procedures (protocols or actions) which imple-
ment the identification of current illegal states and recovery for legal states. There is a
subset ST of events modelling recovery phases for demonstrating the stabilization pro-
cess. The system recovers using a finite number of stabilization steps (r). The process is
modelled as an event r of CV (⊆ ST ) eventually leading to the legal states (convergence
property) from recovery states. During the recovery phase, a fault may occur (see dotted
transitions in Fig.1).
The system S can be represented by a set of events M = CL ∪ ST ∪ F , where the
model M contains a set (CL) of events for representing the computation steps of the
system S . When a fault occurs, a set (ST ) of events simulates the stabilization process
that is performed by S . The formal representation expresses a closed model but we do
not know what is the complete set of events modelling faults/failures. We characterise
the fault model in a very abstract way and it may be possible to develop the fault model
according to the assumptions on the environment, but we do not consider this in the
current study. We restrict our study by making explicit the events of ST modelling the
stabilization of the system from illegal/failed states. We ensure that the convergence is
always possible: a subset CV of ST eventually leads S into the legal states satisfying
the invariant P of the system. Whenever the system S is in a legal state, we consider
that the events of ST are either not operative or simply preserve the invariant P of the
system.
In the previous paragraph, we name procedures ( protocols or actions) by the term
events. An event is modelling a process which is defined by its pre and post specifications
or a state transformation belonging to a larger process. It means that we need to play
with abstraction levels to develop a self-⋆ system. For instance, one can state that an
event called stabilise is ensuring the functionality of getting a stable system (the what)
without giving details of the detailed process itself (the how). Hence, the notion of
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event is identified to an abstraction level and can be either modelling a global process
(the what) or a local update of a variable (the how). We formalise the system S using
the EVENT B modelling language [1], dealing with events and invariant properties
including convergence properties by using a temporal framework. The service-as-
event paradigm [3] helps to express this concretisation process: the procedures (1)
leading from the illegal states to the recovery states, and (2) leading from the recovery
states to the legal states are stated by (abstract) events, during the first stages of the
EVENT B development. The next step is to unfold each (abstract procedure) event, by
refinement, to a set of coordinated and concrete events, which form the body of the
procedure.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents related works. Section 3
introduces the EVENT B modelling framework including service-as-event paradigm and
a formal definition of self-⋆ systems. Section 4 presents the formal verification approach
and illustrates the proposed methodology with the study of the self-healing P2P-based
protocol [14]. Section 5 discusses on approaches for studying temporal properties for
EVENT B models. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper along with future work.
2 Related Works on Formal Modelling for Self-⋆ Systems
Systems usually run in intricate environments, with frequent and unexpected changes.
This feature increases interest towards autonomous and self-⋆ architectures, as they
are able to adapt themselves according to the changes that may occur in the systems
(faults, etc.) or in the environment. Applying formal methods to self-⋆ systems originates
from the needs of understanding how these systems behave and how they meet their
specifications. A self-⋆ system relies on emergent behaviours, resulting from interactions
between components of the system [21].
Traditionally, the correctness of self-⋆ and autonomous systems is validated through
the simulation and testing [20, 22]. However, simulation and testing are not sufficient
to cover the whole set of possible states of a system [2]. Therefore, formal methods
appear as a promising land for validating self-⋆ systems, as long as formal techniques can
assert the correctness of these systems and certify target properties, like trustworthiness,
security, efficiency, etc. under the rigorous mathematical reasoning [6, 8, 24].
Smith et al. [21] have applied the stepwise refinement using Z to study a case of self-
reconfiguration, where a set of autonomous robotic agents is able to assemble and to reach
a global shape. They do not validate models using an adequate tool (e.g. proof checker,
proof assistant, etc.) and models are not localized. Calinescu et al. [6] have used Alloy to
demonstrate the correctness of the autonomic computing policies (ACP). However, Alloy
does not provide a mechanism for expressing the correct-by-construction paradigm.
Méry et al. [2] have also investigated a self-reconfiguring system (Network-on-Chip:
adaptative XY routing) using the EVENT B framework and the correct-by-construction
approach.
State exploration approaches such as model-checking are also used to study self-⋆
systems. Model-checkers like SPIN, PRISM, SMV, UPPAAL are used for properties
specification and getting evidences that properties, such as flexibility, robustness of the
self-⋆ systems hold [6, 8, 10, 24]. Moreover, these tools allow users to obtain the metrics
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for the self-⋆ systems, such as performance, and quantitative evaluations [6, 8, 10, 24].
Model-checking and state-space evaluation can be used during the conception of self-⋆
systems, but they are especially used for runtime verification [10,24]. The limit of model
checking is clearly the size of models.
Other formal techniques like static analysis and design by contract are also applied
for the formal specification of self-⋆ systems [23]. These techniques are mainly used
for runtime verification. Graphical approaches, such as Petri Nets, are used to model
the temporal aspects and communication flows between different components of a
self-⋆ system, and helped to study the cases like self-reconfiguration (replacement of a
component, removal of a link between two components, etc.) [24].
Finally, graphical notations (e.g. UML) help to represent self-⋆ systems with under-
standable figures [25]. Their general purpose is to provide users an insight of a self-⋆
system by describing its architecture, the relationships between agents of the system
(OperA methodology [17], ADELFE [20]) or by presenting the system as a composi-
tion of extendable/instantiable primitives (FORMS [25]). These notations are generally
graphical front-ends for the more complex representations of self-⋆ systems, where the
source code [20], and formal models [25] can be generated from the notations.
Our proposed methodology integrates the EVENT B method and elements of tempo-
ral logics. Using the refinement technique, we gradually build models of self-⋆ systems
in the EVENT B framework. Moreover, we use the service-as-event paradigm to describe
the stabilization and convergence from illegal states to legal ones. Self-⋆ systems require
the expression of traces properties like liveness properties and we borrow a minimal set
of inference rules for deriving liveness properties. The concept of refinement diagrams
intends to capture the intuition of the designer for deriving progressively the target
self-⋆ system. The RODIN platform provides a laboratory for checking, animating and
validating the formal models.
3 Modelling Framework
3.1 EVENT B
We advocate the use of correct-by-construction paradigm for modelling the self-⋆
systems. The key concept is the incremental refinement (simulation) which provides link
between discrete models by preserving properties. The EVENT B modelling language
designed by Abrial [1] is based on set theory and the refinement of models: an abstract
model expressing the requirements of a given system can be verified and validated
easily; a concrete model corresponding to the actual system is constructed progressively
by refining the abstraction. EVENT B is supported by a complete toolset RODIN [19]
providing features like refinement, proof obligations generation, proof assistants and
model-checking.
Modelling Actions over States The EVENT B modelling language can express safety
properties, which are either invariants or theorems in a model corresponding to the
system. Two main structures are available in EVENT B : (1) Contexts express static
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informations about the model (for instance, graph properties as connectivity); (2) Ma-
chines express dynamic informations about the model, safety properties, and events. An
EVENT B model is defined by a context and a machine. A machine organises events (or
actions) modifying state variables and uses static informations defined in a context. An
EVENT B model is characterised by a (finite) list x of state variables possibly modified
by a (finite) list of events. An invariant I(x) states properties that must always be satisfied
by the variables x and maintained by the activation of the events. The general form of an
event e is as follows: ANY t WHERE G(t,x) THEN x : |P(t,x,x′) END and corresponds
to the transformation of the state of the variable x, which is described by a before-after
predicate BA(e)(x,x′): the predicate is semantically equivalent to ∃t ·G(t,x)∧P(t,x,x′) and
expresses the relationship linking the values of the state variables before (x) and just
after (x′) the execution of the event e. Proof obligations are produced by RODIN, from
events: INV1 and INV2 state that an invariant condition I(x) is preserved; their general
form follows immediately from the definition of the before-after predicate BA(e)(x,x′)
of each event e; FIS expresses the feasibility of an event e, with respect to the invariant
I. By proving feasibility, we achieve that BA(e)(x,z) provides a next state whenever the
guard grd(e)(x) holds: the guard is the enabling condition of the event.
Model Refinement The refinement of models extends the structures described previ-
ously, and relates an abstract model and a concrete model. This feature allows us to
develop EVENT B models of the self-⋆ approach gradually and validate each decision
step using the proof tool. The refinement relationship is expressed as follows: a model
AM is refined by a model CM, when CM simulates AM (i.e. when a concrete event ce
occurs in CM, there must be a corresponding enabling abstract event ae in AM). The final
concrete model is closer to the behaviour of a real system that observes events using real
source code. The relationships between contexts, machines and events are illustrated by
the following diagrams (Fig. 2) , which consider refinements of events and machines.
Fig. 2: Machines and Contexts relationships
The refinement of a formal model allows us to enrich the model via a step-by-step
approach and is the foundation of our correct-by-construction approach [12]. Refinement
provides a way to strengthen invariants and to add details to a model. It is also used
to transform an abstract model to a more concrete version by modifying the state
description. This is done by extending the list of state variables (possibly suppressing
some of them), by refining each abstract event to a set of possible concrete versions,
and by adding new events. We suppose (see Fig. 2) that an abstract model AM with
variables x and an invariant I(x) is refined by a concrete model CM with variables y. The
abstract state variables, x, and the concrete ones, y, are linked together by means of a,
so-called, gluing invariant J(x,y). Event ae is in abstract model AM and event ce is in
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concrete model CM. Event ce refines event ae. BA(ae)(x,x′) and BA(ce)(y,y′) are predicates
of events ae and ce respectively; we have to discharge the following proof obligation:
I(x) ∧ J(x,y) ∧ BA(ce)(y,y′) ⇒ ∃x′ · (BA(ae)(x,x′) ∧ J(x′,y′))
Due to limitations on the number of pages, we have briefly introduced the EVENT B
modelling language and the structures proposed for organising the formal development.
However, more details are available in [1] and on the Internet1. In fact, the refinement-
based development of EVENT B requires a very careful derivation process, integrating
possible tough interactive proofs. For assisting the development of the self-⋆ systems, we
use the service description and decomposition that is provided by the service-as-event [3]
paradigm (derived from the call-as-event approach [15]).
3.2 The Service-as-Event Paradigm
This section introduces the refinement diagrams [3, 15] and presents the service-as-event
paradigm. A brief overview on the usage of these formalisms for modelling the self-⋆
systems is given.
Objectives The service-as-event paradigm [3, 15] is a semantical extension of EVENT
B and introduces a way to deal with liveness properties and traces, for modelling the
self-⋆ systems.
A Definition of Self-⋆ Mechanism We characterize a self-stabilizing system S (more
generally a self-⋆ system) by its ability to recover autonomously from an illegal (faulty)
state (violating the invariant P of the system) to a legal (correct) state statisfying the
invariant property P of system S . Temporal logic [3, 11, 15, 18] can be used to describe
such mechanism, using the liveness properties: we represent the stabilization (especially
the convergence) property as a service where a system S , in an illegal state (characterized
by ¬P), reaches eventually a legal state (satisfying P). This service is expressed, with
the leads to ( ) operator, as follows: (¬P) P. This leads to property (equivalently
((¬P)⇒⋄P)) states that every illegal state (satisfying ¬P) will eventually (at some point
in the future) lead to a legal state (satisfying P).
We define a temporal framework for the EVENT B model M of the studied system
S by the following TLA specification: S pec(M): Init(y)∧[Next]y ∧L, where Init(y) is
the predicate specifying initial states; Next ≡ ∃e ∈ E.BA(e)(y,y′) is an action formula
representing the next-state relation; and L is a conjunction of formulas WFy(e) : we
express a weak fairness assumption over each event e modelling a step of the recovery
process (we do not add any fairness on events leading to illegal states (faults)).
1 http://lfm.iti.kit.edu/download/EventB_Summary.pdf
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Fig. 3: A Refinement Diagram
with liveness properties under fairness assump-
tions. Refinement diagrams (see in Fig.3), intro-
duced by Méry et al in [3, 15], allow to develop
EVENT B models and add control inside these
models. They are also used for stating (proofs of)
liveness properties (under fairness assumptions),
and for supporting refinement. Therefore, these di-
agrams are suitable for representing the models of
self-⋆ systems. A refinement diagram D =̂ PD(M)
for a machine M is defined as follows:
PD(M) = (A,M,G,E), where A is a set of assertions, G a set of assertions for M called
conditions/guards of the form g(x), E is the set of events of M. The diagram PD(M) is a
labelled directed graph over A, with labels from G or E , satisfying the following rules:
(1) if an assertion R is related to another assertion S, by an unique non-dotted arrow
labelled e ∈ E (where e does not model a fault), then the property R S is satisfied; (2)
if R is related to S1, . . .Sp, then each arrow from R to Si is labelled by a guard gi ∈ G.
The diagram D possesses proved properties:
1. If M satisfies P Q and Q R, it satisfies P R.
2. If M satisfies P Q and R Q, it satisfies (P∨R) Q.
3. If I is invariant for M and if M satisfies P∧ I Q, then M satisfies P Q.
4. If I is invariant for M and if M satisfies P∧ I ⇒ Q, then M satisfies P Q.
5. If P
e
−→ Q is a link of D for the machine M, then M satisfies P Q.
6. If P and Q are two nodes of D such that there is a path in D from P to Q and any path
from P can be extended in a path containing Q, then M satisfies P Q.
7. If I, U , V , P, Q are assertions such that I is the invariant of M; P∧ I ⇒U ; V ⇒ Q; and
there is a path from U to V and each path from U leads to V ; then M satisfies P Q.
These refinement diagrams are attached to EVENT B models and are used for deriv-
ing liveness properties. As an example, the diagram in Fig.3 represents a model of a
self-stabilizing system: the diagram relates a pair of assertions (¬P,P), where ¬P is a
precondition stating that the studied system is in an illegal state (P does not hold); and
P is the post-condition, describing the desired legal state. We observe that the leads to
property (¬P) P, demonstrating the stabilization and convergence, is satisfied by the
diagram and the model linked to it.
Applying the Service-as-Event Paradigm [3] We apply the service-as-event paradigm,
for formalizing the self-⋆ systems.
1. Describing stabilization and convergence as a service. We express the stabiliza-
tion and convergence properties of a self-⋆ system S , where service is stated by the
following property: (¬P) P. An abstract event (e) is used for describing the ser-
vice/procedure represented by (¬P) P: (¬P)
e
−→ P; where (¬P) is a pre-condition
for triggering event (e); and P is a post-condition defined by the actions of event (e),
which should be satisfied by the "execution" of event.
7
2. Decomposing stabilization and convergence into simple steps. We decompose
the abstract service stated by (¬P) P into simple sub-procedures/steps, using the
inference rules [11] related to the leads to properties:
Fig. 4: Proof Tree - Usage of Inference Rules
This process is similar to refinement (see Fig.5), since we add, at each level of the
proof tree, a new state Rk (0 ≤ k ≤ n) leading from (¬P) to P. The initial property
(¬P) P is decomposed, until the identification of the stabilization steps is satis-
factory. The stabilization phase is expressed by the property
Fig. 5: Decomposition and Refinement
(¬P)  R0 ∧ R0  R1 ∧ . . . ∧
Rn−1  Rn ∧Rn  P, which states
the convergence leading to the de-
sired legal states. Each level of the
proof tree corresponds to a level of
refinement (see Fig.5) in the
formal development. Each leads to
property demonstrates a service of
stabilization, which is defined by an event in the model.
4 Stepwise Design of the Self-Healing Approach
4.1 Introduction to the Self-Healing P2P-Based Approach
The development of self-healing P2P-based approach is proposed by Marquezan et
al. [14], where system reliability is the main concern. The self-healing process ensures
the maintenance of proper functioning of the system services. If a service fails then it
switches from a legal state to a faulty state. The self-healing/recovery procedure ensures
that the service switches back to the legal state. The services run in a distributed (P2P)
system composed of agents/peers executing instances of tasks. The services and peers
notions are introduced as: (1) Management Services: Tasks/Services are executed by
the peers; (2) Instances of Management Services: Peers executing a certain type of
management service; (3) Management Peer Group (MPG): Instances of the same
management service. The self-healing property can be described as follows: (1) Self-
identification triggers to detect the failure of service. This mechanism identifies running
or failed instances of a management service. (2) Self-activation is started, whenever
a management service will be detected fail by the self-identification. Self-activation
evaluates if the management service needs a recovery, based on the criticality of the
failure: if there are still enough instances for running the service, the recovery procedure
is not started; otherwise, the self-configuration mechanism is triggered for repairing the
service. (3) Self-configuration is activated if the failure of service is critical: the role of
this mechanism is to instantiate the failed management service, and to return the service
into a legal state.
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4.2 The Formal Design
Figure 6 depicts the formal design of self-healing P2P-based approach. The model
M0 abstracts the self-healing approach. The refinements M1, M2, M3 introduce step-by-
step the self-detection, self-activation and self-configuration phases, respectively. The
remaining refinements, from M4 to M20, are used for localisation of the system: each
step of the algorithm is made local to a node. The last refinement M21 presents a local
model that describes a set of procedures for recovering process of P2P system.
Fig. 6: Architecture
Abstracting the Self-Healing Approach (M0) This section
presents an abstraction of the self-healing procedure for a
failed service. Each service (s) is described by two states: RUN
(legal/running state) and FAIL (illegal/faulty state). A variable
serviceState is defined as s 7→ st ∈ serviceState, where s de-
notes a service and st denotes a possible state. A property P
expresses that a service (s) is in a legal running state that is
formalised as P =̂ (s 7→ RUN ∈ serviceState). An event FAIL-
URE models a faulty behaviour, where service (s) enters into
a faulty state (FAIL), satisfying ¬P. The self-healing of man-
agement service (s) is expressed as (¬P) P. The recovery
procedure is stated by an event HEAL ((¬P)
HEAL
−−−→ P), where
service (s) recovers from an illegal faulty state (FAIL) to a le-
gal running state (RUN). The refinement diagram1 (see Fig.7)











grd1 : s ∈ SERV ICES
THEN
act1 : serviceState :=





grd1 : s ∈ SERV ICES
grd2 : s 7→ FAIL ∈ serviceState
THEN
act1 : serviceState :=
(serviceState\{s 7→ FAIL})
∪{s 7→ RUN}
This macro/abstract view of the self-healing is detailed by refinement2, using intermedi-
ate steps. A set of new variables is introduced to capture the system requirements. The
variables are denoted by NAME_{Re f inement Level}.
Introducing the Self-Detection (M1) The variable serviceState is replaced, by refine-
ment, with a new variable serviceState_1, since new states are introduced. The states
RUN, FAIL are refined into RUN_1, FAIL_1, and a new state (FL_DT _1) is defined. A
service (s) can suspect and identify a failure state (FAIL_1) before triggering the recov-
ery (HEAL). We introduce a property R0 =̂ (s 7→FL_DT _1∈ serviceState_1) and a new
event FAIL_DETECT in this self-detection mechanism. Let P and ¬P be redefined as fol-
lows: P =̂ (s 7→ RUN_1 ∈ serviceState_1) and ¬P =̂ (s 7→ FAIL_1 ∈ serviceState_1).
1 The assertions (s 7→ st ∈ serviceState), describing the state (st) of a service (s), are shorten into
(st), in the nodes of the refinement diagrams, for practical purposes.
2 ⊕: to add elements to a model, ⊖: to remove elements from a model
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The intermediate steps of self-detection are introduced according to the refinement dia-
gram (see Fig.8) and proof tree.
Fig. 8: Self-Detection
(¬P) R0 R0 P
trans
(¬P) P
The event FAIL_DETECT is introduced to express
the self-detection: the failure state (FAIL_1) of a
service (s) is detected (state FL_DT _1).
The property (¬P) R0 is expressed by the event FAIL_DETECT, where the failure
(FAIL_1) of service (s) is identified (FL_DT _1). R0 P is defined by the event HEAL,
where the service (s) is restored to a legal running state (RUN_1) after failure detection.
The same method is applied to identify all the phases of self-healing algorithm. Due to
limited space, we focus on the interesting parts of models and liveness properties. The
complete formal development of models can be downloaded from web3.
Introducing the Self-Activation (M2) and Self-Configuration (M3) The self-activation
is introduced in this refinement M2 (see Fig. 9), where a failure of a service (s) is evaluated
in terms of critical or non-critical using a new state FL_ACT _2 and an event FAIL_ACTIV.
The self-configuration step is introduced in the next refinement M3 (see Fig.10), which
expresses that if the failure of service (s) is critical, then the self-configuration procedure
for a service (s) will be triggered (state FL_CONF_3), otherwise, the failure will be
ignored (state FL_IGN_3).
Fig. 9: Self-Activation Fig. 10: Self-Configuration
The Global Behaviour (M4) The developed models are refined and decomposed into
several steps (see Fig.11) [14]. These steps are: (1) Self-Detection, (2) Self-Activation,
and (3) Self-Configuration. Self-Detection phase is used to detect any failure in the au-
tonomous system using two events FAIL_DETECT and IS_OK. The event FAIL_DETECT
models the failure detection; and the event IS_OK states that if a detected failure of
a service (s) is a false alarm, then the service (s) returns to a legal state (RUN_4).
Self-Activation process is used to evaluate when actual failures are identified, using
3 http://eb2all.loria.fr/html_files/files/selfhealing/self-healing.zip
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the following events: FAIL_ACTIV, FAIL_IGN, IGNORE, and FAIL_CONF. The events
FAIL_IGN and IGNORE are used to ignore the failure of service (s) when failure is not
in critical state (FL_IGN_4). The event FAIL_CONF is used to evaluate the failure of
service (s) when failure is critical (FL_CONF_4). The last phase Self-Configuration
presents the healing procedure of a failed service using an event REDEPLOY.
From model M5 to M20, we localise the events (we switch from a service point of
view to the instances/peers point of view) and detail the macro (global) steps by
Fig. 11: Self-Healing steps
adding new events, variables,
and constraints. The refine-
ments M5, M6, M7 introduce the
running (run_peers(s)),faulty
( f ail_peers[{s}]), suspicious
(susp_peers(s)) and deployed
peers/instances (dep_inst[{s}])
for a service (s). A function
(min_inst) associates each service
(s) with the minimal number of
instances that is required for
running service (s), and helps to detail the self-activation phase: if the number of running
instances of service (s) is below than minimum, then the failure is critical. The models
M8, M9, M10 detail the self-detection and self-configuration phases to introduce the
token owners for the services. Models from M11 to M20 localise gradually the events (to
switch from a service point of view to the instances/peers point of view). The detailed
formal development of various steps from M5 to M20 are given in the archive 3. Due to
limited space, in the following section, we present only the local model M21.
The Local Model (M21) This model details locally the self-healing procedure of a
service (s). The peers instantiating management service (s) are introduced, as well as
the notion of token owner. The token owner is a peer instance of service (s) that is
marked as a token owner for the Management Peer Group (MPG). It can perform the
self-healing procedure using self-detection, self-activation, and self-configuration steps.
(1) Self-Detection introduces an event SUSPECT_INST that states that the token owner
for service (s) is able to suspect a set (susp) of unavailable peers instances of service (s).
Other events RECONTACT_INST_OK and RECONTACT_INST_KO are used to specify
the successful recontact, and failed recontact, respectively, of the unavailable instances
for ensuring the failed states. Moreover, the token owner is able to monitor the status of
service (s) using two events FAIL_DETECT, and IS_OK. If there are unavailable instances
after the recontacting procedure, the token owner informs the safe members of MPG of
failed instances using the event FAIL_DETECT, otherwise, the token owner indicates that
service is running properly. (2) Self-Activation introduces an event FAIL_ACTIV that
states that if there are failed instances of service (s), then the token owner evaluates if the
failure is critical. Another event FAIL_IGNORE specifies that the failure is not critical.
An event IGNORE can ignore the failure if several instances (more than minimum)
are running correctly. If the number of instances for the running service (s) will be
less than the minimum required services, then the failure will be declared critical, and
the self-healing process will be triggered using an event FAIL_CONFIGURE. (3) Self-
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Configuration introduces three events REDEPLOY_INSTC, REDEPLOY_INSTS and
REDEPLOY that specify that if the failure of service (s) is critical, then new instances
of running service (s) can be deployed until to reach the minimal number of instances,
and after the event HEAL can be triggered corresponding to the convergence of the
self-healing process.
It is noticeable that the architectural decomposition of the self-healing process is
emphasized in this model, by the events related to the algorithm. There is also a set of
events describing actions related to the environment. MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL: a set of
peers (prs) becomes unavailable (can not be
contacted); MAKE_PEER_AVAIL: a formerly
unavailable instance (p) becomes available;
UNFAIL_PEER: a failed instance re-enters a
legal running state.
This model M21 describes locally the
Self-Healing P2P-Based Approach, where
we have formulated hypotheses for ensuring
the correct functioning of the self-healing
process: (1) Event MAKE_PEER_AVAIL: If
the token owner of a service (s) becomes un-
available,at least one peer, with the same
characteristics as the disabled token owner
(state, local informations about running,
failed peers, etc.) can become the new token
owner of service (s); (2) Event REDEPLOY_INSTC: There is always a sufficient number
of available peers that can be deployed to reach the legal running state of a service (s).
In a nutshell, we say that our methodology allows users to understand the self-⋆ mech-
anisms and to gain insight into their architectures (components, coordination, etc.); and
gives evidences of the correctness of self-⋆ systems under some assumptions/hypotheses.
5 Analysis of Temporal Properties for Event-B Models
Leuschel et al. [13] developed a tool ProB for animating, model-checking, and verifying
the consistency of Event-B models. ProB provides two ways for analysing Event-B
models : constraint-based checking and temporal model-checking. We focus on temporal
model-checking, since we are interested in liveness properties. Temporal model-checking
[13] allows ProB to detect problems with a model (invariants violation, deadlocks, etc.)
and to verify if the model satisfies LTL properties: ProB explores the state space of
the model and tries to find a counter-example (i.e. a sequence of events) leading to the
violation of invariants or LTL properties.
A difference with TLC (model-checker for TLA+) is that ProB does not support
fairness [9], allowing unfair traces to be analysed during model-checking. Therefore, the
TLA+ framework is more suited to our work, since we are verifying liveness properties,
in Event-B models, under fairness assumptions.
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6 Discussion, Conclusion and Future Work
We present a methodology based on liveness properties and refinement diagrams for
modelling the self-⋆ systems using EVENT B. We characterize the self-⋆ systems by
three modes (abstract states): 1) legal (correct) state, 2) illegal (faulty) state, and 3)
recovery state. We have proposed a generic pattern for deriving correct self-⋆ systems
(see Fig.1). The service-as-event and call-as-event paradigms provide a way to express
the relationships between modes for ensuring required properties as convergence. The
correct-by-construction principle gives us the possibility to refine procedures from events
and to link modes. The key idea is to identify the modes (considered as abstract states)
and the required abstract steps to allow the navigation between modes, and then to
gradually enrich abstract models, using refinement to introduce the concrete states and
events. We have illustrated our methodology by the self-healing approach [14].
The complexity of the development is measured by the number of proof obligations
(PO) which are automatically/manually discharged (see Table 1). It should be noted that
a large majority (∼ 70%) of the 1177 manual proofs is solved by simply running the
provers. The actual summary of proof obligations is given by Table 2. The manually
discharged POs (327) require analysis and skills: searching and adding premises, simpli-
fying the complex predicates, and even transforming goals are needed to discharge these
POs. Examples of difficult POs are related to proving the finiteness of Management Peer
Groups (MPG), during the redeployment operation of the self-configuration phase.
Model Total Auto Interactive
CONTEXTS 30 26 86.67% 4 13.33%
M0 3 3 100% 0 0%
M1 21 15 71.4% 6 28.6%
M2 46 39 84.8% 7 15.2%
M3 68 0 0% 68 100%
M4 142 16 11.27% 126 88.75%
M5 46 17 39.95% 29 63.05%
OTHER MACHINES 1065 141 12.44% 924 87.56%
M21 13 0 0% 13 100%
TOTAL 1434 257 17.9% 1177 82.1%
Table 1: Summary of Proof Obligations
Total Auto Quasi-Auto Manual
1434 257 17.9% 850 59.3% 327 22.8%
Table 2: Synthesis of POs
Furthermore, our refinement-based formal-
ization allows us to produce final local
models close to the source code. Our fu-
ture works include the development of tech-
niques for generating applications from
the resulting model extending tools like
EB2ALL [16]. Moreover, further case stud-
ies will help us to discover new patterns;
these patterns will be added to a catalogue of patterns that could be implemented in
the Rodin platform. Finally, another point would be to take into account dependability
properties in our methodology.
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C00
CONTEXTC00 ›SETSSERVICES  ›STATES  ›CONSTANTSRUN  ›FAIL  ›InitState  ›AXIOMSaxm1: SERVICES ≠ ∅ not theorem ›axm2: STATES = {RUN, FAIL} not theorem ›axm3: RUN ≠ FAIL not theorem ›axm4: InitState ∈ SERVICES ↔ STATES not theorem ›axm5: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ s ↦ RUN ∈ InitState not theorem ›axm6: ∀ s, st1, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st1 ∈ STATES ∧ st2 ∈ STATES ∧ s ↦ st1 ∈ InitState ∧ s ↦ st2 ∈ InitState ⇒ st1 = st2 not theorem ›END
Page 1
C01
CONTEXTC01 ›EXTENDS C00 SETSSTKTES_1  ›CONSTKNTSRUN_1  ›FKIL_1  ›FKIL_DETECT_1  ›InitState_1  ›KXIOMSaam1T partition(STKTES_1, {RUN_1},{FKIL_1},{FKIL_DETECT_1}) not theorem ›aam2T InitState_1 ∈ SERVICES ↔ STKTES_1 not theorem ›aam3T ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ s ↦ RUN_1 ∈ InitState_1 not theorem ›aam4T ∀ s, st1, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st1 ∈ STKTES_1 ∧ st2 ∈ STKTES_1 ∧ s ↦ st1 ∈ InitState_1 ∧ s ↦ st2 ∈ InitState_1 ⇒ st1 = st2 not theorem ›END
Page 1
C02
CONTEXTC02 ›EXTENDS C0H SETSSTATES_2  ›CONSTANTSRUN_2  ›FAIL_2  ›FAIL_DETECT_2  ›FAIL_ACTIV_2  ›InitState_2  ›AXIOMSaxmH: partition(STATES_2, {RUN_2},{FAIL_2},{FAIL_DETECT_2},{FAIL_ACTIV_2}) not theorem ›axm2: InitState_2 ∈ SERVICES ↔ STATES_2 not theorem ›axm3: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ s ↦ RUN_2 ∈ InitState_2 not theorem ›axm4: ∀ s, stH, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∨ stH ∈ STATES_2 ∨ st2 ∈ STATES_2 ∨ s ↦ stH ∈ InitState_2 ∨ s ↦ st2 ∈ InitState_2 ⇒ stH = st2 not theorem ›END
Page H
C03
CONTEXTC03 ›EXTENDS C02 SETSSTATES_3  ›CONSTANTSRUN_3  ›FAIL_3  ›FAIL_DETECT_3  ›FAIL_ACTIV_3  ›FAIL_CONFIG_3  ›FAIL_IGN_3  ›InitState_3  ›AXIOMSaxm1: partition(STATES_3, {RUN_3},{FAIL_3},{FAIL_DETECT_3},{FAIL_ACTIV_3},{FAIL_CONFIG_3},{FAIL_IGN_3}) not theorem ›axm2: InitState_3 ∈ SERVICES ↔ STATES_3 not theorem ›axm3: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ s ↦ RUN_3 ∈ InitState_3 not theorem ›axm4: ∀ s, st1, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∨ st1 ∈ STATES_3 ∨ st2 ∈ STATES_3 ∨ s ↦ st1 ∈ InitState_3 ∨ s ↦ st2 ∈ InitState_3 ⇒ st1 = st2 not theorem ›END
Page 1
C04
CONTEXTC04 ›EXTENDS C03 SETSSTATES_4  ›CONSTANTSRUN_4  ›FAIL_4  ›FAIL_DETECT_4  ›FAIL_ACTIV_4  ›FAIL_CONFIG_4  ›FAIL_IGN_4  ›DPL_4  ›InitState_4  ›AXIOMSaxm1: partition(STATES_4, {RUN_4},{FAIL_4},{FAIL_DETECT_4},{FAIL_ACTIV_4},{FAIL_CONFIG_4},{FAIL_IGN_4},{DPL_4}) not theorem ›axm2: InitState_4 ∈ SERVICES ↔ STATES_4 not theorem ›axm3: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ InitState_4 not theorem ›axm4: ∀ s, st1, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st1 ∈ STATES_4 ∧ st2 ∈ STATES_4 ∧ s ↦ st1 ∈ InitState_4 ∧ s ↦ st2 ∈ InitState_4 ⇒ st1 = st2 not theorem ›END
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C05
CONTEXTC05 ›EXTENDS C04 CONSTANTSmin_inst  ›init_inst  ›AXIOMSaxm1: min_inst ∈ SERVICES → ℕ1 not theorem ›axm2: init_inst ∈ SERVICES → ℕ1 not theorem ›axm3: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ min_inst(s) ≥ 2 not theorem ›axm4: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ init_inst(s) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›axm5: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ init_inst(s) ≥ 2 theorem ›END
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C06
CONTEXTC06 ›EXTENDS C05 SETSVEERS  ›Set of VEERSCONSTANTSInitSrvcVeers  ›Initial set of peers / instances per serviceAXIOMSaxm1: InitSrvcVeers ∈ SERVICES → ℙ1(VEERS) not theorem ›each service is proviUeU by a non empty set of peers/instancesaxm2: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ finite(InitSrvcVeers(s)) not theorem ›each service is proviUeU by a finite set of peers/instancesaxm3: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ carU(InitSrvcVeers(s)) = init_inst(s) not theorem ›each service s is proviUeU by peers/instances, whose number is init_inst(s)axm4: ∀ s1, s2 · s1 ⊆ VEERS ∧ s2 ⊆ VEERS ∧ s1 ≠ ∅ ∧ s2 ≠ ∅ ∧ finite(s1) ∧ finite(s2) ∧ s1 ⊂ s2 ⇒ carU(s1) ≤ carU(s2)−1  not theorem ›axm5: ∀ s1 · s1 ⊆ VEERS ∧ s1 ≠ ∅ ∧ finite(s1) ⇒ carU(s1) > 0 theorem ›axm6: ∀ s1, s2 · s1 ⊆ VEERS ∧ s2 ⊆ VEERS ∧ finite(s1) ∧ finite(s2) ∧ s1 ⊆ s2 ⇒ carU(s2) − carU(s1) = carU(s2∖s1)  not theorem ›END
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C07
CONTEXTC07 ›EXTENDS C06 CONSTANTSdeplo_inst  ›AXIOMSaxm1: ∀ set, s1, s2 · set ⊆ SERVICES×PEERS ∧ s1 ∈ SERVICES ∧ s2 ∈ SERVICES ∧ s1 = s2 ⇒ ({s1} ⩤ set)[{s2}] = ∅ theorem ›axm2: ∀ set, s1, s2 · set ⊆ SERVICES×PEERS ∧ s1 ∈ SERVICES ∧ s2 ∈ SERVICES ∧ s1 ≠ s2 ⇒ ({s1} ⩤ set)[{s2}] = set[{s2}] theorem ›axm3: ∀ set, s1, s2, p · set ⊆ SERVICES×PEERS ∧ s1 ∈ SERVICES ∧ s2 ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ∈ PEERS ∧ s1 = s2 ⇒ (set = {s1 ↦ p})[{s2}] = set[{s2}]={p} theorem › axm4: ∀ set, s1, s2, p · set ⊆ SERVICES×PEERS ∧ s1 ∈ SERVICES ∧ s2 ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ∈ PEERS ∧ s1 ≠ s2 ⇒ (set = {s1 ↦ p})[{s2}] = set[{s2}] theorem ›axm5: deplo_inst ∈ SERVICES → ℕ1 not theorem ›END
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CONTEXTC08 ›EXTENDS C07 CONSTANTSinit_tok  ›InitStatus  ›InitSuspPeers  ›InitFail  ›AXIOMSaxm1: init_tok ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›axm2: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ init_tok(s) ∈ InitSrvcPeers(s) not theorem › axm3: ∀ a1, a2 · a1 ∈ PEERS ↔ (SERVICES×PEERS) ∧ a2 ∈ PEERS ↔ (SERVICES×PEERS) ∧ finite(a1) ∧ a2 ⊆ a1 ⇒ finite(a2) not theorem ›axm4: InitStatus ∈ (PEERS × SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›axm5: ∀ s, p · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ∈ PEERS ∧ p = init_tok(s) ⇒ (p ↦ s) ↦ RUN_4 ∈ InitStatus   not theorem ›axm6: ∀ s, p, stt · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ∈ PEERS ∧ stt ∈ STATES_4 ∧ (p ↦ s) ↦ stt ∈ InitStatus ⇒ p = init_tok(s) ∧ stt = RUN_4 not theorem ›axm7: InitSuspPeers ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›axm8: ∀ p, s, sp · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ sp ⊆ PEERS ∧ (p ↦ s) ↦ sp ∈ InitSuspPeers ⇒ p = init_tok(s) ∧ sp = ∅ not theorem ›axm9: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p = init_tok(s) ⇒ (p ↦ s) ↦ ∅ ∈ InitSuspPeers not theorem ›axm10: InitFail ∈ SERVICES → ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›axm11: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ InitFail(s) = ∅ not theorem ›END
Page 1
C09
CONTEXTC09 ›EXTENDS C08 CONSTANTS1niPSPsPeSrv  ›1niPSuspPrs  ›1niPRunPeers  ›AX1OMSsxm1: 1niPSPsPeSrv ∈ PEERS × SERV1CES ⇸ STATES_4 noP Pheorem ›sxm2: ∀ s↦ p · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERV1CES ∧ p ∈ 1niPSrvcPeers(s( ⇒ (p ↦ s( ↦ RUN_4 ∈ 1niPSPsPeSrv noP Pheorem ›sxm3: ∀ s↦ p↦ sPP · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERV1CES ∧ (p ↦ s( ↦ sPP ∈ 1niPSPsPeSrv ⇒ p ∈ 1niPSrvcPeers(s( ∧ sPP = RUN_4 noP Pheorem ›sxm4: 1niPSuspPrs ∈ PEERS × SERV1CES ⇸ ℙ(PEERS( noP Pheorem ›sxm5: ∀ s↦ p · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERV1CES ∧ p ∈ 1niPSrvcPeers(s( ⇒ (p ↦ s( ↦ ∅ ∈ 1niPSuspPrs noP Pheorem ›sxm6: ∀ s↦ p↦ sPP · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERV1CES ∧ (p ↦ s( ↦ sPP ∈ 1niPSuspPrs ⇒ p ∈ 1niPSrvcPeers(s( ∧ sPP = ∅  noP Pheorem ›sxm7: 1niPRunPeers ∈ PEERS × SERV1CES ⇸ ℙ(PEERS( noP Pheorem ›sxm8: ∀ s↦ p · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERV1CES ∧ p ∈ 1niPSrvcPeers(s( ⇒ (p ↦ s( ↦ 1niPSrvcPeers(s( ∈ 1niPRunPeers noP Pheorem ›sxm9: ∀ s↦ p↦ sPP · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERV1CES ∧ (p ↦ s( ↦ sPP ∈ 1niPRunPeers ⇒ p ∈ 1niPSrvcPeers(s( ∧ sPP = 1niPSrvcPeers(s(  noP Pheorem ›END
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M00
MACHINEM00 ›SEES C00 VARIABLESserviceState  ›INVARIANTSinv1: serviceState ∈ SERVICES ↔ STATES not theorem ›inv2: ∀ s, st1, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st1 ∈ STATES ∧ st2 ∈ STATES ∧ s ↦ st1 ∈ serviceState ∧ s ↦ st2 ∈ serviceState ⇒ st1 = st2 not theorem ›EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extended ordinary ›THENact1: serviceState ≔ InitState ›END
FAIL:  not extended ordinary ›ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState ≔ ({s} ⩤ serviceState) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL}  ›END




MACHINEM01 ›REFINES M00 SEES C01 VARIABLESserviceState_1  ›INVARIANTSinv1: serviceState_1 ∈ SERVICES ↔ STATES_1 not theorem ›gluing_run1: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ RUN ∈ serviceState ⇒ s ↦ RUN_1 ∈ serviceState_1 not theorem ›gluing_run2: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ RUN_1 ∈ serviceState_1 ⇒ s ↦ RUN ∈ serviceState not theorem ›gluing_fail1: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL ∈ serviceState ⇒ (s ↦ FAIL_1 ∈ serviceState_1 ∨ s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_1 ∈ serviceState_1( not theorem ›gluing_fail2: ∀ s, st · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st ∈ STATES_1 ∧ st ∈ {FAIL_1,FAIL_DETECT_1} ∧ s ↦ st ∈ serviceState_1 ⇒ s ↦ FAIL ∈ serviceState not theorem ›gluing_state3: ∀ s, st1, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st1 ∈ STATES_1 ∧ st2 ∈ STATES_1 ∧ s ↦ st1 ∈ serviceState_1 ∧ s ↦ st2 ∈ serviceState_1 ⇒ st1 = st2 not theorem ›EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extended ordinary ›THENact1: serviceState_1 ≔ InitState_1 ›END
FAIL:  not extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ RUN_1 ∈ serviceState_1 not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_1 ≔ (serviceState_1∖{s ↦ RUN_1}( ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_1}  › END
FAIL_DETECT:  not extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
Page 1
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grd2: s ↦ FAIL_1 ∈ serviceState_1 not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_1 ≔ (serviceState_1∖{s ↦ FAIL_1}( ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_1}  ›END




MACHINEM02 ›REFINES M0 SEES C02 VARIABLES
erviceState_2  ›INVARIANSinvG1 serviceState_2 : SERVICES ∈ S AES_2 n↔t toe↔reh  ›mglinm_rlnG1 u  ∀  : SE RVICES ∧  ∧ RUN_ G : erviceState_ G ⇒  ∧ RUN_2 : erviceSt ate_2 n↔t toe↔reh  ›mglinm_rln2 : u  ∀  : SE RVICES ∧  ∧ RUN_ 2 : erviceState_ 2 ⇒  ∧ RUN_G : erviceSt ate_G n↔t toe↔reh  ›mglinm_⇒aigG1 u  ∀  : SER VICES ∧  ∧ FAIL_ G : erviceState_ G ⇒  ∧ FAIL_2 : erviceS tate_2 n↔t toe↔reh  ›mglinm_⇒aig2 : u  ∀  : SER VICES ∧  ∧ FAIL_ 2 : erviceState_ 2 ⇒  ∧ FAIL_G : erviceS tate_G n↔t toe↔reh  ›mglinm_ftctG1 u  ∀  : SER VICES ∧  ∧ FAIL_ dEEC_G : ervic eState_G ⇒  ∧ FAIL_ACI V_2 : erviceStat e_2   ∧ FAIL_dE EC_2 : erviceS tate_2) n↔t toe↔reh ›mglinm_ftct2 : u O t ∀  :  SERVICES ∧ t : SAES_2 ∧ t : GFAIL_ACIV_2OFAI L_dEEC_2) ∧  ∧  t : erviceStat e_2 ⇒  ∧ FAIL_d EEC_G : 
erviceState_G n↔t toe↔reh  ›mglinm_state1 u O tO t2  ∀  : SERVICES ∧  t : SAES_2 ∧  t2 : SAES_2 ∧  ∧ t  : erviceState_ 2 ∧  ∧ t2 : er viceState_2 ⇒ t  = t2 n↔t toe↔reh ›EVENSINITIALISATION:  n↔t extenfef  orfinar} ›
HEN
ctG1 serviceState_2 ≔ InitState_ 2 ›ENd
FAIL1  n↔t extenfef  orfinar} ›REFINES FAIL ANx s  ›yHEREmrfG1 s : SERVICES n↔t toe↔reh  ›mrf2 :  ∧ RUN_2 :  erviceState_2 n↔t toe↔reh  ›
HEN
ctG1 serviceState_2 ≔ erviceState _2≔Gs ∧ RUN_2)) Y  Gs ∧ FAIL_2)  › ENd
FAIL_DETECT1  n↔t extenfef  orfinar} ›REFINES
Wame 
M02
 FAIL_dEEC  ANx s  ›yHEREmrfG1 s : SERVICES n↔t toe↔reh  ›mrf2 :  ∧ FAIL_2 : erviceState_2 n↔t toe↔reh  ›
HEN
	ctG1 serviceState_2 ≔ 
erviceState _2≔Gs ∧ FAIL2)) Y Gs ∧ FAIL_dEEC_2)  ›ENd
IS_O1 n↔t extenfef  orfinar} ›REFINES HEAL ANx s  ›yHEREmrfG1 s : SERVICES n↔t toe↔reh  ›mrf2 :  ∧ FAIL_dEE C_2 : erviceSta te_2 n↔t toe↔reh  ›
HEN
	ctG1 serviceState_2 ≔ 
erviceState _2 ≔ Gs ∧ FAIL_dE EC_2)) Y Gs ∧ RUN_2) ›ENd
FAIL_ACTIS1  n↔t extenfef  orfinar} ›ANx s  ›yHEREmrfG1 s : SERVICES n↔t toe↔reh  ›mrf2 :  ∧ FAIL_dEE C_2 : erviceSta te_2 n↔t toe↔reh  ›
HEN
	ctG1 serviceState_2 ≔ 
erviceState _2 ≔ Gs ∧ FAIL_dE EC_2)) Y Gs ∧ FAIL_ACIV _2) ›ENd
GEAL1  n↔t extenfef  orfinar} ›REFINES HEAL ANx s  ›yHEREmrfG1 s : SERVICES n↔t toe↔reh  ›mrf2 :  ∧ FAIL_ACI V_2 : erviceStat e_2 n↔t toe↔reh  ›
HEN
	ctG1 serviceState_2 ≔ 






MACHINEM03 ›REFINES M0G SEES C03 VARIABLES
erviceState_3  ›INVARIANSinv1: serviceState_3 ∈ SERVICES ↔ S AES_3 not theorem  ›gluing_run1: ∀  ·  ∈ SE RVICES ∧   RN_ G ∈ erviceState_ G ⇒   RN_3 ∈ erviceSt ate_3 not theorem  ›gluing_runG: ∀  ·  ∈ SE RVICES ∧   RN_ 3 ∈ erviceState_ 3 ⇒   RN_G ∈ erviceSt ate_G not theorem  ›gluing_fail1: ∀  ·  ∈ SER VICES ∧   FAIL_ G ∈ erviceState_ G ⇒   FAIL_3 ∈ erviceS tate_3 not theorem  ›gluing_failG: ∀  ·  ∈ SER VICES ∧   FAIL_ 3 ∈ erviceState_ 3 ⇒   FAIL_G ∈ erviceS tate_G not theorem  ›gluing_dtct1: ∀  ·  ∈ SER VICES ∧   FAIL_ DEEC_G ∈ ervic eState_G ⇒   FAIL_DEEC _3 ∈ erviceStat e_3 not theorem  ›gluing_dtctG: ∀  ·  ∈ SER VICES ∧   FAIL_ DEEC_3 ∈ ervic eState_3 ⇒   FAIL_DEEC _G ∈ erviceStat e_G not theorem  ›gluing_act1: ∀  ·  ∈ SE RVICES ∧   FAIL _ACIV_G ∈ ervic eState_G ⇒   FAIL_ACI V_3 ∈ erviceStat e_3    FAIL_CO NFIG_3 ∈ erviceS tate_3    FAIL_IGN_3 ∈ erv iceState_3) not theorem  ›gluing_actG: ∀ , t ·  ∈ SERVICES ∧ t ∈  SAES_3 ∧ t ∈ {FAIL_ACIV_3,FAI L_CONFIG_3,FAIL_I GN_3} ∧   t ∈ erviceState_3 ⇒    FAIL_ACIV_G ∈ e rviceState_G not theorem  ›gluing_state: ∀ , t1, tG  ·  ∈ SERVICES ∧  t1 ∈ SAES_3 ∧  tG ∈ SAES_3 ∧   t 1 ∈ erviceState_ 3 ∧   tG ∈ er viceState_3 ⇒ t 1  tG not theorem ›EVENSINITIALISATION:  not extended  ordinary ›
HEN
ct1: serviceState_3 ≔ InitState_ 3 ›END
FAIL:  not extended  ordinary ›REFINES FAIL ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem  ›grdG: s  RN_3 ∈  erviceState_3 not theorem  ›
HEN




FAIL_DETECT:  not extended  ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_DEEC  ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem  ›grdG: s  FAIL_3 ∈ erviceState_3 not theorem  ›
HEN
ct1: serviceState_3 ≔ erviceState _3∖{s  FAIL_3}) ∪ {s  FAIL_DEEC_3}  ›END
IS_O:  not extended  ordinary ›REFINES IS_OK ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem  ›grdG: s  FAIL_DEE C_3 ∈ erviceSta te_3 not theorem  ›
HEN
ct1: serviceState_3 ≔ erviceState _3 ∖ {s  FAIL_DE EC_3}) ∪ {s  RN_3} ›END
FAIL_ACTIS:  not extended  ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_ACIV  ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem  ›grdG: s  FAIL_DEE C_3 ∈ erviceSta te_3 not theorem  ›
HEN
ct1: serviceState_3 ≔ erviceState _3 ∖ {s  FAIL_DE EC_3}) ∪ {s  FAIL_ACIV _3} ›END
FAIL_CONF_IGN: not extended ordinary ›ANY s  ›st  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd3: st ∈ {FAIL_CONFIG_3,FAIL_IGN_3} not theorem ›
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grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_3 ∈ serviceState_3 not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_3 ≔ (serviceState_3 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_3}) ∪ {s ↦ st} › END




MACHINEM04 ›REFINES M03 SEES C04 VARIABLESserviceState_4  ›INVARIANTSinv1: serviceState_4 ∈ SERVICES ↔ S TATES_4 not thHorHm ›gluing_run1: ∀ Y · Y ∈ SE RVICES ∧ s ↦ RUN_3 ∈ YHrvicHStatH_ 3 ⇒ Y ↦ RUN_4 ∈ YHrvicHSt atH_4 not thHorHm ›gluing_run2: ∀ Y · Y ∈ SE RVICES ∧ s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ YHrvicHStatH_ 4 ⇒ Y ↦ RUN_3 ∈ YHrvicHSt atH_3 not thHorHm ›gluing_fail1: ∀ Y · Y ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_3 ∈ YHrvicHStatH_ 3 ⇒ Y ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ YHrvicHS tatH_4 not th orHm ›gluing_fail2: ∀ Y · Y ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ YHrvicHStatH_ 4 ⇒ Y ↦ FAIL_3 ∈ YHrvicHS tatH_3 not th orHm ›gluing_dtct1: ∀ Y · Y ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_DETEC_3 ∈ YHrvic HStatH_3 ⇒ Y ↦ FAIL_DETEC _4 ∈ YHrvicHStat H_4 not thHorHm ›gluing_dtct2: ∀ Y · Y ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_DETEC_4 ∈ YHrvic HStatH_4 ⇒ Y ↦ FAIL_DETEC _3 ∈ YHrvicHStat H_3 not thHorHm ›gluing_act1: ∀ Y · Y ∈ SE RVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_3 ∈ YHrvic HStatH_3 ⇒ Y ↦ FAIL_ACIV _4 ∈ YHrvicHStatH _4 not thHorHm ›gluing_act2: ∀ Y · Y ∈ SE RVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ YHrvic HStatH_4 ⇒ Y ↦ FAIL_ACIV _3 ∈ YHrvicHStatH _3 not thHorHm ›gluing_ign1: ∀ Y · Y ∈ SE RVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_IGN_3 ∈ YHrvicHS tatH_3 ⇒ Y ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ YHrvicHStatH_4 no  thHorHm ›gluing_ign2: ∀ Y · Y ∈ SE RVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ YHrvicHS tatH_4 ⇒ Y ↦ FAIL_IGN_3 ∈ YHrvicHStatH_3 no  thHorHm ›gluing_conf1: ∀ Y · Y ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_3 ∈ YHrvic HStatH_3 ⇒ (Y ↦ FAIL_CONF IG_4 ∈ YHrvicHSta tH_4 ∨ Y ↦ DPL_4 ∈ YHrvicHStatH_4)  not thHorHm › gluing_conf2: ∀ Y, Yt · Y ∈  SERVICES ∧ st ∈ STATES_4 ∧ Yt ∈ {FAIL_CONFIG_4,DP L_4} ∧ Y ↦ Yt ∈ Y HrvicHStatH_4 ⇒ Y ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_3  ∈ YHrvicHStatH_3 not thHorHm ›gluing_YtatH: ∀ Y, Yt1, Yt2  · Y ∈ SERVICES ∧ st1 ∈ STATES_4 ∧  Yt2 ∈ STATES_4 ∧ Y ↦ Yt 1 ∈ YHrvicHStatH_ 4 ∧ Y ↦ Yt2 ∈ YHrvicHStatH_4 ⇒ Yt 1 = Yt2 not thHorHm ›EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extHndHd ordinary ›
HEN
ct1: YHrvicHStatH_ 4 ≔ InitStatH_ 4 ›END
FAIL:  not HxtHndHd ordinary ›REFINES FAIL 
PagH 1
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ANY Y  ›WHEREgrd1: Y ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: Y ↦ RUN_4 ∈ Y HrvicHStatH_4 no  thHorHm ›
HEN
ct1: YHrvicHStatH_ 4 ≔ (YHrvicHStatH _4∖{Y ↦ RUN_4}) ∪  {Y ↦ FAIL_4}  › END
FAIL_DETECT:  not HxtHndHd ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_DETEC  ANY Y  ›WHEREgrd1: Y ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: Y ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ YHrvicHStatH_4 not thHorHm ›
HEN
ct1: YHrvicHStatH_ 4 ≔ (YHrvicHStatH _4∖{Y ↦ FAIL_4}) ∪ {Y ↦ FAIL_DETEC_4}  ›END
IS_O:  not HxtHndHd ordinary ›REFINES IS_OK ANY Y  ›WHEREgrd1: Y ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: Y ↦ FAIL_DETEC_4 ∈ YHrvicHSta tH_4 not thHorHm ›
HEN
ct1: YHrvicHStatH_ 4 ≔ (YHrvicHStatH _4 ∖ {Y ↦ FAIL_DE TEC_4}) ∪ {Y ↦ RUN_4} ›END
FAIL_ACTI :  not HxtHndHd ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_ACIV  ANY Y  ›WHEREgrd1: Y ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: Y ↦ FAIL_DETEC_4 ∈ YHrvicHSta tH_4 not thHorHm ›
HEN
ct1: YHrvicHStatH_ 4 ≔ (YHrvicHStatH _4 ∖ {Y ↦ FAIL_DE TEC_4}) ∪ {Y ↦ FAIL_AC V _4} ›END
PagH 2
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FAIL_CONFIGURE:  not extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_CONF_IGN ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceStat e_4 not theorem ›WITHst: st = FAIL_CONFI G_3 ›THENact1: serviceState_ 4 ≔ (serviceState _4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_AC TIV_4}) ∪{s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_ 4} ›END
FAIL_IGNORE:  not extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_CONF_IGN ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceStat e_4 not theorem ›WITHst: st=FAIL_IGN_3 ›THENact1: serviceState_ 4 ≔ (serviceState _4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_AC TIV_4}) ∪{s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4} ›END
IGNORE: not HxtHndHd ordinary ›REFINES HEAL ANY Y  ›WHEREgrd1: Y ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: Y ↦ FAIL_IGN_ 4 ∈ YHrvicHStatH_ 4 no  thHorHm ›WITHYt: Yt = FAIL_IGN_3  ›
!HEN
"ct1: YHrvicHStatH_ 4 ≔ (YHrvicHStatH _4 ∖ {Y ↦ FAIL_IG N_4}) ∪ {Y ↦ RUN_4} ›END
REDE#LOY:  not HxtHndHd ordinary ›ANY
PagH 3
M04
s  ›WHEREgrd1: Y ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: Y ↦ FAIL_CONF IG_4 ∈ YHrvicHSta tH_4 not thHor m ›
$HEN
%ct1: YHrvicHStatH_ 4 ≔ (YHrvicHStatH _4 ∖ {Y ↦ FAIL_CO NFIG_4}) ∪ {Y ↦ DPL_4} ›END
HEAL:  not HxtHndHd ordinary ›REFINES HEAL ANY Y  ›WHEREgrd1: Y ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: Y ↦ DPL_4 ∈ Y HrvicHStatH_4 no  hHorHm ›WITHYt: Yt=FAIL_CONFIG_ 3 ›
$HEN




MACHINEM05 ›REFINES M04 SEES C05 VARIABLESserviceState_4  ›num_run  ›num_susp  ›INVARIANTSinv1: num_run ∈ SERVICES → :1 not theorem ›inv2: num_susp ∈ SERVICES → : not theorem ›inv3: ∀ s, st · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st ∈ STATES_4 ∧ st ∉ {FAIL_4, FAIL_DETECT_4} ∧ s ↦ st ∈ serviceState_4 ⇒ num_susp(s) = 0 not theorem ›inv4: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 ⇒ num_susp(s) = 0 theorem ›inv5: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 ⇒ num_run(s) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›inv6: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ num_susp(s) < num_run(s) not theorem ›EVENTSINITIALISATION:  extended ordinary ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ InitState_4 ›act2: num_run ≔ init_inst ›act3: num_susp ≔ SERVICES×{0} ›END
FAIL:  extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL ANY s  ›nb_fail  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd3: nb_fail ∈ :1 not theorem ›grd4: nb_fail < num_run(s) not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4∖{s ↦ RUN_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_4}  › act2: num_susp(s) ≔ nb_fail ›END
FAIL_DETECT:  extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_DETECT 
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ANY s  ›num_safe  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd3: num_safe ∈ : not theorem ›grd4: num_safe ≤ num_susp(s) not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4∖{s ↦ FAIL_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4}  ›act2: num_susp(s) ≔ num_susp(s) − num_safe ›END
IS_O&:  extended ordinary ›REFINES IS_OK ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd3: num_susp(s) = 0 not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4}) ∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›END
FAIL_ACTI':  extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_ACTIV ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd3: num_susp(s) > 0 not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4} ›act2: num_run(s) ≔ num_run(s) − num_susp(s) ›act3: num_susp(s) ≔ 0 ›END
FAIL_CONFIGURE:  extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_CONFIGURE ANY
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s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd3: num_run(s) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4} ›END
FAIL_IGNORE:  extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_IGNORE ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd3: num_run(s) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4} ›END
IGNORE: extended ordinary ›REFINES IGNORE ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4}) ∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›END
REDE(LOY:  extended ordinary ›REFINES REDEPLOY ANY s  ›new_run  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd3: new_run ∈ :1 not theorem ›grd4: new_run ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
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THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4}) ∪ {s ↦ DPL_4} › act2: num_run(s) ≔ new_run ›END




MACHINEM06 ›REFINES M05 SEES C06 VARIABLESserviceState_4  ›run_peers  ›susp_peers  ›fail_peers  ›INVARIANTSinv1: run_peers ∈ SERVICES → ℙ1(PEERS) not theorem ›inv2: susp_peers ∈ SERVICES ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›inv3: fail_peers ∈ SERVICES ↔ PEERS not theorem ›gluing_run1: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ finite(run_peers(s)) not theorem ›the number of instances providing a service s is finitegluing_run2: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ num_run(s) = card(run_peers(s)) not theorem ›the number of instances providing a service s is num_run_peers(s)gluing_susp1: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) ⇒ finite(susp_peers(s)) not theorem ›the number of suspect instances of a service s is finite gluing_susp2: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES  ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) ⇒ num_susp(s) = card(susp_peers(s)) not theorem ›the number of suspect instances of a service s is num_susp_peers(s)inv4: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ run_peers(s) ∩ fail_peers[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›an instance of a service s is either failed or providing the service sinv5: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) ⇒ susp_peers(s) ⊆ run_peers(s) not theorem ›suspicious instances of s are a subset of the instances providing sinv6: ∀ s, st · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st ∈ STATES_4 ∧ st ∈ {FAIL_4, FAIL_DETECT_4} ∧ s ↦ st ∈ serviceState_4 ⇒ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) not theorem ›inv7: ∀ s, st · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st ∈ STATES_4 ∧ st ∈ {FAIL_4, FAIL_DETECT_4} ∧ s ↦ st ∈ serviceState_4 ⇒ susp_peers(s) ⊂ run_peers(s) not theorem ›EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extended ordinary ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ InitState_4 ›act2: run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›act3: susp_peers ≔ ∅ ›act4: fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›END
FAIL:  not extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL ANY
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s  ›fp  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd5: fp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›grd3: fp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›grd4: fp ⊂ run_peers(s) not theorem ›WITHnb_fail: nb_fail=card(fp) ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4∖{s ↦ RUN_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_4}  › act2: susp_peers(s) ≔ fp ›END
FAIL_DETECT:  not extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_DETECT ANY s  ›sf  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd5: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›grd6: sf ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›grd7: sf ⊆ susp_peers(s) not theorem ›WITHnum_safe: num_safe=card(sf) ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4∖{s ↦ FAIL_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4}  ›act2: susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_peers(s) ∖ sf ›END




FAIL_ACTI*:  not extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_ACTIV ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd5: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4} ›act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∖ susp_peers(s) ›act3: susp_peers(s) ≔ ∅ ›act4: fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×susp_peers(s)) ›END
FAIL_CONFIGURE:  not extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_CONFIGURE ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd3: card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4} ›END
FAIL_IGNORE:  not extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_IGNORE ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd3: card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4} ›END
IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
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REFINES IGNORE ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4}) ∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›END
REDE+LOY:  not extended ordinary ›REFINES REDEPLOY ANY s  ›new_inst  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd3: new_inst ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›grd5: new_inst ≠ ∅ not theorem ›grd6: finite(new_inst) not theorem ›grd7: run_peers(s) ∩ new_inst = ∅ not theorem ›grd8: fail_peers[{s}] ∩ new_inst = ∅ not theorem ›grd4: card(run_peers(s))+card(new_inst) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem › WITHnew_run: new_run=card(run_peers(s))+card(new_inst) ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4}) ∪ {s ↦ DPL_4} › act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ new_inst ›END
HEAL:  extended ordinary ›REFINES HEAL ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ DPL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ DPL_4}) ∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} › END
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MACHINEM07 ›REFINES M06 SEES C07 VARIABLESserviceState_4  ›run_peers  ›susp_peers  ›fail_peers  ›dep_inst  ›INVARIANTSinv1: dep_inst ∈ SERVICES ↔ PEERS not theorem ›inv2: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dep_inst[{s}] ∩ fail_peers[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›inv3: ∀ s, st · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st ∈ STATES_4 ∧ s ↦ st ∈ serviceState_4 ∧ st ≠ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ⇒ dep_inst[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›inv4: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ finite(dep_inst[{s}]) not theorem ›inv5: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dep_inst[{s}] ∩ run_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›EVENTSINITIALISATION:  extended ordinary ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ InitState_4 ›act2: run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›act3: susp_peers ≔ ∅ ›act4: fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›act5: dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›END
FAIL:  extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL ANY s  ›fp  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd5: fp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›grd3: fp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›grd4: fp ⊂ run_peers(s) not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4∖{s ↦ RUN_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_4}  › act2: susp_peers(s) ≔ fp ›END
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FAIL_DETECT-  extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_DETECT ANY s  ›sf  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd5: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›grd6: sf ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›grd7: sf ⊆ susp_peers(s) not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4∖{s ↦ FAIL_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4}  ›act2: susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_peers(s) ∖ sf ›END
IS_O.:  extended ordinary ›REFINES IS_OK ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd5: susp_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4}) ∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›END




FAIL_CONFIGURE:  extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_CONFIGURE ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd3: card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4} ›END
FAIL_IGNORE:  extended ordinary ›REFINES FAIL_IGNORE ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd3: card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4} ›END
IGNORE: extended ordinary ›REFINES IGNORE ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4}) ∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›END
REDE0LOY_INST : not extended ordinary ›ANY s  ›dep  ›WHERE
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grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: dep ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›grd3: finite(dep) not theorem ›grd4: dep ∩ run_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›grd5: dep ∩ fail_peers[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›grd6: card(dep) = deplo_inst(s) not theorem ›grd7: card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem › grd8: s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›THENact1: dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×dep) ›END
REDE1LOY:  not extended ordinary ›REFINES REDEPLOY ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›grd6: dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›grd4: card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_inst[{s}]) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem › WITHnew_inst: new_inst=dep_inst[{s}] ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4}) ∪ {s ↦ DPL_4} › act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›act3: dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›END
HEAL:  extended ordinary ›REFINES HEAL ANY s  ›WHEREgrd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›grd2: s ↦ DPL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›THENact1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ DPL_4}) ∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} › END
UNFAIL_1EER:  extended ordinary ›REFINES
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inv1: token_owner ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›
inv2: unav_peers ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
inv3: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ∈ run_peers(s)∖unav_peers 
not theorem ›
inv4: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) ⇒ token_owner(s) ∉ 
susp_peers(s) not theorem ›
inv5: susp_inst ∈ PEERS ↔ (SERVICES×PEERS) not theorem ›
inv6: ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_inst[{ld}]) 
⇒ ld = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
inv7: ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_inst[{ld}]) ∧ 
ld = token_owner(s) ⇒ ld ∉ susp_inst[{ld}][{s}] not theorem ›
inv8: ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_inst[{ld}]) ∧ 
ld = token_owner(s) ⇒ susp_inst[{ld}][{s}] ⊂ run_peers(s) not theorem ›
inv9: ∀ ld, s, stt · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ stt ∈ STATES_4 ∧ s ↦ 
stt ∈ serviceState_4 ∧ ld = token_owner(s) ∧ stt ≠ RUN_4 ⇒ susp_inst[{ld}][{s}] 
= ∅ not theorem ›
EVENTSINITIALISATION:  extended ordinary ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ InitState_4 ›
act2: run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
act3: susp_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act4: fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act5: dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act6: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act7: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act8: susp_inst ≔ ∅ ›
END





E  ›new values for token owner per service if needed
WHERE
grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›
grd3: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›new value for token 
owner per service if needed
grd4: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does 
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
grd5: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∉ 
dom(susp_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ fail_peers
[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes 
unavailable and the service is not suspicious, 
     
                                                                                        
then a new token owner among available peers is chosen
grd6: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∈ 
dom(susp_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ susp_peers(srv) ∪ 
fail_peers[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes 
unavailable, and the service
     
                                                                                        
possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not 
     
                                                                                        
suspicious peers is chosen
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become 
unavailable
act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new value for token owner 
per service is given if needed
act3: susp_inst ≔ prs ⩤ susp_inst ›the peers in prs can not 
suspect instances anymore
END
SUSPECT_INST:  not extended ordinary ›
ANY
s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances 
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
grd4: s ∉ dom(susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}]) not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s





act1: susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ∪ ({token_owner(s)} × ({s}×susp)) 
›the members of susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›




act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4∖{s ↦ RUN_4}) ∪ {s ↦ 
FAIL_4}  ›
act2: susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
act3: susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(susp_inst)) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd5: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd6: sf ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd7: sf ⊆ susp_peers(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4∖{s ↦ FAIL_4}) ∪ {s ↦ 
FAIL_DETECT_4}  ›
act2: susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_peers(s) ∖ sf ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
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grd2: s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd5: susp_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4}) 
∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd5: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4}) 
∪ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4} ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∖ susp_peers(s) ›
act3: susp_peers(s) ≔ ∅ ›
act4: fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×susp_peers(s)) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd3: card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪ 
{s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›




act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪ 
{s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4}) ∪ 
{s ↦ RUN_4} ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: dep ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: finite(dep) not theorem ›
grd4: dep ∩ run_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: dep ∩ fail_peers[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›
grd6: card(dep) = deplo_inst(s) not theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd8: s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×dep) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd6: dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›





act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4}) 
∪ {s ↦ DPL_4} ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›
act3: dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ DPL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ DPL_4}) ∪ {s ↦ 
RUN_4} ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: fail_peers ≔ fail_peers∖{s ↦ p} ›
END




grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN




















rec_inst  ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
rct_inst  ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
INVARIANTS
inv1: rec_inst ∈ PEERS ↔ (SERVICES×PEERS) not theorem ›
inv2: rct_inst ∈ PEERS ↔ (SERVICES×PEERS) not theorem ›
inv3: ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ rct_inst[{ld}][{s}] ≠ ∅ ⇒ 
rec_inst[{ld}][{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
inv4: ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ rct_inst[{ld}][{s}] ≠ ∅ ⇒ 
rct_inst[{ld}][{s}] ⊆ rec_inst[{ld}][{s}] not theorem ›
inv5: ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(rec_inst[{ld}]) ⇒ 
ld = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
inv6: ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(rec_inst[{ld}]) ∧ 
ld = token_owner(s) ⇒ ld ∉ rec_inst[{ld}][{s}] not theorem ›
inv7: ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(rct_inst[{ld}]) ⇒ 
ld = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
inv8: ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(rct_inst[{ld}]) ∧ 
ld = token_owner(s) ⇒ ld ∉ rct_inst[{ld}][{s}] not theorem ›
inv9: dom(rct_inst) ⊆ dom(rec_inst) not theorem ›
inv10: ∀ ld · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ ld ∈ dom(rct_inst) ⇒ rct_inst[{ld}]  ⊆ 
rec_inst[{ld}] theorem ›
inv11: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) ⇒ token_owner(s) ∉ 
susp_peers(s) not theorem ›
EVENTSINITIALISATION:  extended ordinary ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ InitState_4 ›
act2: run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
act3: susp_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act4: fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act5: dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act6: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act7: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act8: susp_inst ≔ ∅ ›
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act10: rec_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act11: rct_inst ≔ ∅ ›
END





E  ›new values for token owner per service if needed
WHERE
grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›
grd3: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›new value for token 
owner per service if needed
grd4: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does 
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
grd5: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∉ 
dom(susp_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ fail_peers
[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes 
unavailable and the service is not suspicious, 
     
                                                                                        
then a new token owner among available peers is chosen
grd6: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∈ 
dom(susp_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ susp_peers(srv) ∪ 
fail_peers[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes 
unavailable, and the service
     
                                                                                        
possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not 
     
                                                                                        
suspicious peers is chosen
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become 
unavailable
act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new value for token owner 
per service is given if needed
act3: susp_inst ≔ prs ⩤ susp_inst ›the peers in prs can not 
suspect instances anymore
act4: rec_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rec_inst ›
act5: rct_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rct_inst ›
END






s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances 
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
grd4: s ∉ dom(susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}]) not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
grd5: s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›the state of s 
is OK
THEN
act1: susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ∪ ({token_owner(s)} × ({s}×susp)) 
›the members of susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd3: susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4∖{s ↦ RUN_4}) ∪ {s ↦ 
FAIL_4}  ›
act2: susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
act3: susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(susp_inst)) ›
END
RECONTACT_INST_OK:  not extended ordinary ›
ANY
s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›the state of s 
is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set of suspicious 
peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ susp_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›i is a 
suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
grd6: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the 
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
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grd6: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the 
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ susp_peers(s) not 
theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all the suspecious 
instances of s
THEN
act1: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the 
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
act2: rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›i is 
recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
END
RECONTACT_INST_KO:  not extended ordinary ›
ANY
s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›the state of s 
is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set of suspicious 
peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ susp_peers(s)∩unav_peers not theorem ›i is a 
suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be contacted)
grd6: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the 
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ susp_peers(s) not 
theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all the suspecious 
instances of s
THEN
act1: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the 
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd5: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›







act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4∖{s ↦ FAIL_4}) ∪ {s ↦ 
FAIL_DETECT_4}  ›
act2: susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_peers(s) ∖ rct_inst[{token_owner
(s)}][{s}] ›
act3: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rec_inst)) ›
act4: rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rct_inst)) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd5: susp_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4}) 
∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd5: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4}) 
∪ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4} ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∖ susp_peers(s) ›
act3: susp_peers(s) ≔ ∅ ›
act4: fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×susp_peers(s)) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›




act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪ 
{s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd3: card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪ 
{s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4}) ∪ 
{s ↦ RUN_4} ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: dep ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: finite(dep) not theorem ›
grd4: dep ∩ run_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: dep ∩ fail_peers[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›
grd6: card(dep) = deplo_inst(s) not theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›




act1: dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×dep) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd6: dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd4: card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_inst[{s}]) ≥ min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4}) 
∪ {s ↦ DPL_4} ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›
act3: dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ DPL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ DPL_4}) ∪ {s ↦ 
RUN_4} ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
THEN










grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN




















rec_inst  ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
rct_inst  ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
actv_inst  ›instances activated by token ownes
INVARIANTS
inv1: actv_inst ∈ PEERS ↔ (SERVICES×PEERS) not theorem ›
inv2: ∀ s, i · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ i ∈ PEERS ⇒ finite(actv_inst[{i}][{s}]) 
not theorem ›
inv3: ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(actv_inst[{ld}]) 
⇒ ld = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
inv4: ∀ s, i · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ i ∈ PEERS ⇒ actv_inst[{i}][{s}] ∩ 
run_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
inv5: ∀ s, i · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ i ∈ PEERS ⇒ actv_inst[{i}][{s}] ∩ 
dep_inst[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›
inv6: ∀ s, i · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ i ∈ PEERS ⇒ actv_inst[{i}][{s}] ∩ 
fail_peers[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›
inv7: ∀ ld, s, stt · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ stt ∈ STATES_4 ∧ s ↦ 
stt ∈ serviceState_4 ∧ ld = token_owner(s) ∧ stt ≠ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ⇒ actv_inst
[{ld}][{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›
inv8: finite(actv_inst) not theorem ›
EVENTSINITIALISATION:  extended ordinary ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ InitState_4 ›
act2: run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
act3: susp_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act4: fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act5: dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act6: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act7: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act8: susp_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act10: rec_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act11: rct_inst ≔ ∅ ›









E  ›new values for token owner per service if needed
WHERE
grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›
grd3: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›new value for token 
owner per service if needed
grd4: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does 
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
grd5: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∉ 
dom(susp_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ fail_peers
[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes 
unavailable and the service is not suspicious, 
     
                                                                                        
then a new token owner among available peers is chosen
grd6: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∈ 
dom(susp_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ susp_peers(srv) ∪ 
fail_peers[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes 
unavailable, and the service
     
                                                                                        
possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not 
     
                                                                                        
suspicious peers is chosen
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become 
unavailable
act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new value for token owner 
per service is given if needed
act3: susp_inst ≔ prs ⩤ susp_inst ›the peers in prs can not 
suspect instances anymore
act4: rec_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rec_inst ›
act5: rct_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rct_inst ›
act6: actv_inst ≔ prs ⩤ actv_inst ›
END






s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances 
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
grd4: s ∉ dom(susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}]) not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
grd5: s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›the state of s 
is OK
THEN
act1: susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ∪ ({token_owner(s)} × ({s}×susp)) 
›the members of susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd3: susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4∖{s ↦ RUN_4}) ∪ {s ↦ 
FAIL_4}  ›
act2: susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
act3: susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(susp_inst)) ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›the state of s 
is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set of suspicious 
peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ susp_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›i is a 
suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
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grd6: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the 
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ susp_peers(s) not 
theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all the suspecious 
instances of s
THEN
act1: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the 
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
act2: rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›i is 
recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›the state of s 
is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set of suspicious 
peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ susp_peers(s)∩unav_peers not theorem ›i is a 
suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be contacted)
grd6: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the 
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ susp_peers(s) not 
theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all the suspecious 
instances of s
THEN
act1: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the 
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd5: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›





act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4∖{s ↦ FAIL_4}) ∪ {s ↦ 
FAIL_DETECT_4}  ›
act2: susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_peers(s) ∖ rct_inst[{token_owner
(s)}][{s}] ›
act3: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rec_inst)) ›
act4: rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rct_inst)) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd5: susp_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4}) 
∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd5: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4}) 
∪ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4} ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∖ susp_peers(s) ›
act3: susp_peers(s) ≔ ∅ ›
act4: fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×susp_peers(s)) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
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grd3: card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪ 
{s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd3: card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪ 
{s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4}) ∪ 
{s ↦ RUN_4} ›
END
REDEPLOY_INSTC:  not extended ordinary ›
ANY
s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ fail_peers[{s}] ∪ unav_peers ∪ 
dep_inst[{s}] not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not 
unavailable and is not already activated for s
grd4: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ actv_inst not theorem ›
grd5: s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd6: card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) < deplo_inst(s) 
not theorem ›




grd7: card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
THEN
act1: actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd6: card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) = deplo_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›




act1: dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}]
[{s}]) ›
act2: actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(actv_inst)) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
grd7: actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]=∅ not theorem ›
grd6: dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd4: card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_inst[{s}]) ≥ min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4}) 
∪ {s ↦ DPL_4} ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›
act3: dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: s ↦ DPL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 ∖ {s ↦ DPL_4}) ∪ {s ↦ 
RUN_4} ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: fail_peers ≔ fail_peers∖{s ↦ p} ›
END






grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN



















rec_inst  ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
rct_inst  ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
actv_inst  ›instances activated by token ownes
i_state  ›
INVARIANTS
inv1: i_state ∈ (PEERS × SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4  not theorem ›
inv2: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ↦ s ∈ dom(i_state) not 
theorem ›
gluing_state1: ∀ s, stt · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ stt ∈ STATES_4 ∧ s ↦ stt ∈ 
serviceState_4 ⇒ (token_owner(s) ↦ s) ↦ stt ∈ i_state not theorem ›
gluing_state2: ∀ s, stt · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ stt ∈ STATES_4 ∧ (token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ↦ stt ∈ i_state ⇒ s ↦ stt ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
inv3: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom(i_state) ⇒ p 
= token_owner(s) not theorem ›
EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extended ordinary ›
THEN
act2: run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
act3: susp_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act4: fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act5: dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act6: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act7: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act8: susp_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act10: rec_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act11: rct_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act12: actv_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act13: i_state ≔ InitStatus ›
END







E  ›new values for token owner per service if needed
i_s  ›
WHERE
grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›
grd3: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›new value for token 
owner per service if needed
grd4: i_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
grd5: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does 
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
grd6: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∉ 
dom(susp_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ fail_peers
[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes 
unavailable and the service is not suspicious, 
     
                                                                                        
then a new token owner among available peers is chosen
grd7: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∈ 
dom(susp_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ fail_peers[{srv}] 
∪ susp_peers(srv)) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes 
unavailable, and the service
     
                                                                                        
possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not 
     
                                                                                        
suspicious peers is chosen
grd8: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ↦ s ∈ dom(i_s) ⇒ 
p = E(s) not theorem ›
grd9: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ (E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ i_state
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ i_s not theorem ›
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become 
unavailable
act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new value for token owner 
per service is given if needed
act3: susp_inst ≔ prs ⩤ susp_inst ›the peers in prs can not 
suspect instances anymore
act4: rec_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rec_inst ›the peers in prs can not try 
to recontact instances anymore
act5: rct_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rct_inst ›the peers in prs can not 
recontact instances anymore
act6: actv_inst ≔ prs ⩤ actv_inst ›








s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances 
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
grd4: s ∉ dom(susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}]) not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
grd5: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is OK
THEN
act1: susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ∪ ({token_owner(s)} × ({s}×susp)) 
›the members of susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
grd3: susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_4 ›
act2: susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
act3: susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(susp_inst)) ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set of suspicious 
peers for s is not empty
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grd5: i ∈ susp_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›i is a 
suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
grd6: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the 
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ susp_peers(s) not 
theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all the suspecious 
instances of s
THEN
act1: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the 
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
act2: rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›i is 
recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set of suspicious 
peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ susp_peers(s)∩unav_peers not theorem ›i is a 
suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be contacted)
grd6: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the 
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ susp_peers(s) not 
theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all the suspecious 
instances of s
THEN
act1: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the 
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
grd5: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
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grd8: rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] = susp_peers(s) not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_DETECT_4  ›
act2: susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_peers(s) ∖ rct_inst[{token_owner
(s)}][{s}] ›
act3: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rec_inst)) ›
act4: rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rct_inst)) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem 
›
grd5: susp_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem 
›
grd5: susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∖ susp_peers(s) ›
act3: susp_peers(s) ≔ ∅ ›
act4: fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×susp_peers(s)) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
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grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
grd3: card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
grd3: card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_IGN_4 ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ fail_peers[{s}] ∪ unav_peers ∪ 
dep_inst[{s}] not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not 
unavailable and is not already activated for s
grd4: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ actv_inst not theorem ›
grd5: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›




grd7: card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
THEN
act1: actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd6: card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) = deplo_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd8: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
THEN
act1: dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}]
[{s}]) ›
act2: actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(actv_inst)) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
grd7: actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]=∅ not theorem ›
grd6: dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd4: card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_inst[{s}]) ≥ min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ DPL_4 ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›
act3: dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: fail_peers ≔ fail_peers∖{s ↦ p} ›
END






grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN



















rec_inst  ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
rct_inst  ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
actv_inst  ›instances activated by token ownes
i_state  ›
INVARIANTS
inv1: suspc_peers ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
inv2: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom(suspc_peers) 
⇒ p = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
inv3: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p = token_owner(s) ⇒ (p ↦ 
s) ∈ dom(suspc_peers) not theorem ›
gluing_tok_own1: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) ⇒ 
susp_peers(s) = suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extended ordinary ›
THEN
act2: run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
act3: suspc_peers ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act4: fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act5: dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act6: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act7: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act8: susp_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act10: rec_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act11: rct_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act12: actv_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act13: i_state ≔ InitStatus ›
END











grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›
grd3: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›new value for token 
owner per service if needed
grd4: i_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
grd5: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does 
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
grd6: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ 
token_owner(srv) ↦ srv ∉ dom(suspc_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers 
∪ prs ∪ fail_peers[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service 
becomes unavailable and the service is not suspicious, 
     
                                                                                        
then a new token owner among available peers is chosen
grd7: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ 
token_owner(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(suspc_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers 
∪ prs ∪ fail_peers[{srv}] ∪ suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) not theorem 
›if the owner of the token for a service becomes unavailable, and the service
     
                                                                                        
possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not 
     
                                                                                        
suspicious peers is chosen
grd8: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ↦ s ∈ dom(i_s) ⇒ 
p = E(s) not theorem ›
grd9: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ (E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ i_state
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ i_s not theorem ›
grd10: p_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd11: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ↦ s ∈ dom(p_s) ⇒ 
p = E(s) not theorem ›
grd12: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ (E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ suspc_peers
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ p_s not theorem ›
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become 
unavailable
act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new value for token owner 
per service is given if needed
act3: susp_inst ≔ prs ⩤ susp_inst ›the peers in prs can not 
suspect instances anymore
act4: rec_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rec_inst ›the peers in prs can not try 
to recontact instances anymore




act6: actv_inst ≔ prs ⩤ actv_inst ›
act7: i_state ≔ i_s ›
act8: suspc_peers ≔ p_s ›
END




s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances 
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
grd4: s ∉ dom(susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}]) not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
grd5: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is OK
THEN
act1: susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ∪ ({token_owner(s)} × ({s}×susp)) 
›the members of susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
grd3: susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_4 ›
act2: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp_inst[{token_owner
(s)}][{s}] ›
act3: susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(susp_inst)) ›
END




s  ›a service s




grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set 
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
grd6: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the 
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to 
recontact all the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the 
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
act2: rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›i is 
recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set 
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be 
contacted)
grd6: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the 
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to 
recontact all the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the 
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
grd5: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd8: rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] = suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_DETECT_4  ›
act2: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ rct_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
act3: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rec_inst)) ›
act4: rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rct_inst)) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem 
›
grd5: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem 
›
grd5: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∖ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ›
act3: fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s)) ›










grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
grd3: card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
grd3: card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_IGN_4 ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
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grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ fail_peers[{s}] ∪ unav_peers ∪ 
dep_inst[{s}] not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not 
unavailable and is not already activated for s
grd4: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ actv_inst not theorem ›
grd5: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
grd6: card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) < deplo_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
THEN
act1: actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd6: card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) = deplo_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd8: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
THEN
act1: dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}]
[{s}]) ›
act2: actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(actv_inst)) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
grd7: actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]=∅ not theorem ›
grd6: dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›





act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ DPL_4 ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›
act3: dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: fail_peers ≔ fail_peers∖{s ↦ p} ›
END






grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN



















rec_inst  ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
rct_inst  ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
actv_inst  ›instances activated by token ownes
i_state  ›
INVARIANTS
inv1: suspc_inst ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
inv2: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom(suspc_inst) ⇒ 
p = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
inv3: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p = token_owner(s) ⇒ (p ↦ 
s) ∈ dom(suspc_inst) not theorem ›
gluing_tok_own1: ∀ p, s ·  p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom
(suspc_inst) ⇒ susp_inst[{p}][{s}] = suspc_inst(p ↦ s) not theorem ›
EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extended ordinary ›
THEN
act2: run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
act3: suspc_peers ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act4: fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act5: dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act6: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act7: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act8: suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act10: rec_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act11: rct_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act12: actv_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act13: i_state ≔ InitStatus ›
END












grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›
grd3: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›new value for token 
owner per service if needed
grd4: i_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
grd5: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does 
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
grd6: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ 
token_owner(srv) ↦ srv ∉ dom(suspc_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers 
∪ prs ∪ fail_peers[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service 
becomes unavailable and the service is not suspicious, 
     
                                                                                        
then a new token owner among available peers is chosen
grd7: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ 
token_owner(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(suspc_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers 
∪ prs ∪ fail_peers[{srv}] ∪ suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) not theorem 
›if the owner of the token for a service becomes unavailable, and the service
     
                                                                                        
possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not 
     
                                                                                        
suspicious peers is chosen
grd8: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ↦ s ∈ dom(i_s) ⇒ 
p = E(s) not theorem ›
grd9: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ (E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ i_state
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ i_s not theorem ›
grd10: p_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd11: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ↦ s ∈ dom(p_s) ⇒ 
p = E(s) not theorem ›
grd12: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ (E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ suspc_peers
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ p_s not theorem ›
grd13: s_i ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd14: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ↦ s ∈ dom(s_i) ⇒ 
p = E(s) not theorem ›
grd15: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ (E
(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ suspc_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ s_i not theorem ›
grd16: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ⇒ (E
(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ ∅ ∈ s_i not theorem ›
THEN




act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new value for token owner 
per service is given if needed
act3: rec_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rec_inst ›the peers in prs can not try 
to recontact instances anymore
act4: rct_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rct_inst ›the peers in prs can not 
recontact instances anymore
act5: actv_inst ≔ prs ⩤ actv_inst ›
act6: i_state ≔ i_s ›
act7: suspc_peers ≔ p_s ›
act8: suspc_inst ≔ s_i ›
END




s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances 
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
grd5: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is OK
grd6: susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of 
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
grd3: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_4 ›
act2: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ›








s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set 
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
grd6: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the 
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to 
recontact all the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the 
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
act2: rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›i is 
recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set 
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be 
contacted)
grd6: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the 
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to 
recontact all the suspecious instances of s
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(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to 
recontact all the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the 
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
grd5: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd8: rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] = suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_DETECT_4  ›
act2: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ rct_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
act3: rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rec_inst)) ›
act4: rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rct_inst)) ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem 
›
grd5: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›




grd5: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∖ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ›
act3: fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s)) ›
act4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
grd3: card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
grd3: card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_IGN_4 ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem ›
THEN








s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ fail_peers[{s}] ∪ unav_peers ∪ 
dep_inst[{s}] not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not 
unavailable and is not already activated for s
grd4: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ actv_inst not theorem ›
grd5: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
grd6: card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) < deplo_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
THEN
act1: actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd6: card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) = deplo_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd8: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
THEN
act1: dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}]
[{s}]) ›
act2: actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(actv_inst)) ›
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
grd7: actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]=∅ not theorem ›
grd6: dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd4: card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_inst[{s}]) ≥ min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ DPL_4 ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›
act3: dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: fail_peers ≔ fail_peers∖{s ↦ p} ›
END






grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›























rect_inst  ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
rctt_inst  ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
actv_inst  ›instances activated by token ownes
i_state  ›
INVARIANTS
inv1: rect_inst ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
inv2: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom(rect_inst) ⇒ 
p = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
inv3: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p = token_owner(s) ⇒ (p ↦ 
s) ∈ dom(rect_inst) not theorem ›
gluing_tok_own_rec1: ∀ p, s ·  p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ 
dom(rect_inst) ⇒ rec_inst[{p}][{s}] = rect_inst(p ↦ s) not theorem ›
inv4: rctt_inst ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
inv5: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom(rctt_inst) ⇒ 
p = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
inv6: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p = token_owner(s) ⇒ (p ↦ 
s) ∈ dom(rctt_inst) not theorem ›
gluing_tok_own_rct1: ∀ p, s ·  p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ 
dom(rctt_inst) ⇒ rct_inst[{p}][{s}] = rctt_inst(p ↦ s) not theorem ›
inv7: failr_peers ∈ SERVICES → ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
gluing_fail_1: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ fail_peers[{s}] = failr_peers(s) 
not theorem ›
inv8: dep_instc ∈ SERVICES → ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
gluing_act_1: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dep_inst[{s}] = dep_instc(s) not 
theorem ›
EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extended ordinary ›
THEN
act2: run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
act3: suspc_peers ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act4: failr_peers ≔ InitFail ›
act5: dep_instc ≔ InitFail ›
act6: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act7: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
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act8: suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act10: rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act11: rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act12: actv_inst ≔ ∅ ›
act13: i_state ≔ InitStatus ›
END












grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›
grd3: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›new value for token 
owner per service if needed
grd4: i_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
grd5: p_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd6: s_i ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd7: rt_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd8: rc_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd9: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does 
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
grd10: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ⇒ E
(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ failr_peers(srv) ∪ suspc_peers
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service 
becomes unavailable, and the service
      
                                                                                        
possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not 
      
                                                                                        
suspicious peers is chosen
grd11: dom(i_s) = E∼ ∧ dom(p_s) = dom(i_s) ∧ dom(s_i) = dom
(i_s) ∧ dom(rc_s) = dom(i_s) ∧ dom(rt_s) = dom(i_s)  not theorem ›
grd12: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ ((E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ i_state
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ i_s ∧ (E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) ∈ p_s) not theorem ›
grd13: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ ((E
(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ suspc_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ s_i) ∧ ((E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ rctt_inst(E
(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ rt_s) ∧ ((E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ rect_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ rc_s) not 
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(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ suspc_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ s_i) ∧ ((E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ rctt_inst(E
(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ rt_s) ∧ ((E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ rect_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ rc_s) not 
theorem ›
grd14: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ⇒ ((E
(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ ∅ ∈ s_i) ∧ ((E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ ∅ ∈ rt_s) ∧ ((E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ ∅ ∈ 
rc_s)  not theorem ›
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become 
unavailable
act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new value for token owner 
per service is given if needed
act3: rect_inst ≔ rc_s ›the peers in prs can not try to 
recontact instances anymore
act4: rctt_inst ≔ rt_s ›the peers in prs can not recontact 
instances anymore
act5: actv_inst ≔ prs ⩤ actv_inst ›
act6: i_state ≔ i_s ›
act7: suspc_peers ≔ p_s ›
act8: suspc_inst ≔ s_i ›
END




s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances 
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
grd5: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is OK
grd6: susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of 
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
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grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
grd3: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_4 ›
act2: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ›
act3: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set 
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
act2: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set 
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
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grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set 
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be 
contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
grd5: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd8: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_DETECT_4  ›
act2: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
act3: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
act4: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem 
›
grd5: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem 
›
grd5: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∖ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ›
act3: failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s) ∪ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
act4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
grd3: card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
grd3: card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_IGN_4 ›
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ failr_peers(s) ∪ unav_peers ∪ 
dep_instc(s) not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not 
unavailable and is not already activated for s
grd4: token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ actv_inst not theorem ›
grd5: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
grd6: card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) < deplo_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
THEN
act1: actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd6: card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) = deplo_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd8: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
THEN
act1: dep_instc(s) ≔ dep_instc(s) ∪ actv_inst[{token_owner
(s)}][{s}] ›










grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
grd7: actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]=∅ not theorem ›
grd6: dep_instc(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd4: card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_instc(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ DPL_4 ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_instc(s) ›
act3: dep_instc(s) ≔ ∅ ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: p ∈ failr_peers(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s)∖{p} ›
END








grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN



















rect_inst  ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
rctt_inst  ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
actv_instc  ›instances activated by token ownes
i_state  ›
INVARIANTS
inv1: actv_instc ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
inv2: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom(actv_instc) ⇒ 
p = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
inv3: ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p = token_owner(s) ⇒ (p ↦ 
s) ∈ dom(actv_instc) not theorem ›
gluing_tok_own_rec1: ∀ p, s ·  p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ 
dom(actv_instc) ⇒ actv_inst[{p}][{s}] = actv_instc(p ↦ s) not theorem ›
EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extended ordinary ›
THEN
act2: run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
act3: suspc_peers ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act4: failr_peers ≔ InitFail ›
act5: dep_instc ≔ InitFail ›
act6: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act7: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act8: suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act10: rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act11: rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act12: actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act13: i_state ≔ InitStatus ›
END















grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›
grd3: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›new value for token 
owner per service if needed
grd4: i_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
grd5: p_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd6: s_i ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd7: rt_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd8: rc_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd9: ac_i ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd10: dom(i_s) = E∼ ∧ dom(p_s) = dom(i_s) ∧ dom(s_i) = dom
(i_s) ∧ dom(rc_s) = dom(i_s) ∧ dom(rt_s) = dom(i_s) ∧ dom(ac_i) = dom(i_s) not 
theorem ›
grd11: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs 
      ⇒ 
      E(srv) = token_owner(srv) ∧
      s_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspc_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∧ 
      rt_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = rctt_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∧ 
      rc_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = rect_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∧ 
      ac_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = actv_instc(E(srv) ↦ srv) not 
theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does not belong to prs, the token 
owner is not changed
grd12: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs 
      ⇒ 
      E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ failr_peers
(srv) ∪ suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) ∧
      s_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅  ∧ 
      rt_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅ ∧ 
      rc_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅ ∧
      ac_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅  not theorem ›if the owner of the 
token for a service becomes unavailable, and the service
                                           possess suspicious 
instances, then a new token owner among available and not 
                                           suspicious peers is 
chosen
grd13: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ i_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = i_state
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∧ p_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) not theorem ›
THEN




act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new value for token owner 
per service is given if needed
act3: rect_inst ≔ rc_s ›the peers in prs can not try to 
recontact instances anymore
act4: rctt_inst ≔ rt_s ›the peers in prs can not recontact 
instances anymore
act5: actv_instc ≔ ac_i ›
act6: i_state ≔ i_s ›
act7: suspc_peers ≔ p_s ›
act8: suspc_inst ≔ s_i ›
END




s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances 
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
grd5: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is OK
grd6: susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of 
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
grd3: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_4 ›
act2: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ›








s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set 
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
act2: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set 
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be 
contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
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(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
grd5: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd8: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_DETECT_4  ›
act2: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
act3: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
act4: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem 
›
grd5: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›




grd5: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∖ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ›
act3: failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s) ∪ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
act4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
grd3: card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
grd3: card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_IGN_4 ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem ›
THEN








s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ failr_peers(s) ∪ unav_peers ∪ 
dep_instc(s) not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not 
unavailable and is not already activated for s
grd4: i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
grd5: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
grd6: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
THEN
act1: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd6: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd8: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
THEN
act1: dep_instc(s) ≔ dep_instc(s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ›
act2: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem 
›
grd7: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
grd6: dep_instc(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd4: card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_instc(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ DPL_4 ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_instc(s) ›
act3: dep_instc(s) ≔ ∅ ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
THEN
act1: i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: p ∈ failr_peers(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s)∖{p} ›
END






grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›























rect_inst  ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
rctt_inst  ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
actv_instc  ›instances activated by token ownes
inst_state  ›
INVARIANTS
inv1: inst_state ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
inv2: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ↦ s ∈ dom(inst_state) not 
theorem ›
gluing_state_1: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = 
inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
inv3: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊆ run_peers
(s) not theorem ›
inv4: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊆ 
run_peers(s) not theorem ›
inv5: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊆ run_peers
(s) not theorem ›
inv6: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊆ run_peers
(s) not theorem ›
inv7: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ∉ suspc_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) not theorem ›
inv8: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ∉ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
inv9: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ∉ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) not theorem ›
inv10: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) not theorem ›
inv11: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∩ 
suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
inv12: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∉ 
{FAIL_4,FAIL_DETECT_4} ⇒ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
inv13: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ FAIL_4 ⇒ 
rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
inv14: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ FAIL_4 ⇒ 
rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
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EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extended ordinary ›
THEN
act1: run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
act2: suspc_peers ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act3: failr_peers ≔ InitFail ›
act4: dep_instc ≔ InitFail ›
act5: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act6: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act7: suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act8: rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act9: rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act10: actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act11: inst_state ≔ InitStateSrv ›
END












grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›
grd3: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dom(dom(inst_state) ▷ {srv})
∖prs ≠ ∅  not theorem ›
grd4: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›new value for token 
owner per service if needed
grd5: p_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd6: s_i ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd7: rt_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd8: rc_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd9: ac_i ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
grd10: dom(p_s) = E∼ ∧ dom(s_i) = E∼ ∧ dom(rc_s) = E∼ ∧ dom
(rt_s) = E∼ ∧ dom(ac_i) = E∼ not theorem ›
grd11: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs 
      ⇒ 
      E(srv) = token_owner(srv) ∧
      s_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspc_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∧ 
      rt_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = rctt_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∧ 
      rc_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = rect_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∧ 
      ac_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = actv_instc(E(srv) ↦ srv) not 
theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does not belong to prs, the token 
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      ac_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = actv_instc(E(srv) ↦ srv) not 
theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does not belong to prs, the token 
owner is not changed
grd12: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs 
      ⇒ 
      E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ failr_peers
(srv) ∪ suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) ∧
      E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(inst_state) ∧
      inst_state(E(srv) ↦ srv) = inst_state(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) ∧
      s_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅  ∧ 
      rt_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅ ∧ 
      rc_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅ ∧
      ac_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅  not theorem ›if the owner of the 
token for a service becomes unavailable, and the service
                                           possess suspicious 
instances, then a new token owner among available and not 
                                           suspicious peers is 
chosen
grd13: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ p_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = 
suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) not theorem ›
WITH
i_s: i_s = E∼ ◁ inst_state ›
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become 
unavailable
act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new value for token owner 
per service is given if needed
act3: rect_inst ≔ rc_s ›the peers in prs can not try to 
recontact instances anymore
act4: rctt_inst ≔ rt_s ›the peers in prs can not recontact 
instances anymore
act5: actv_instc ≔ ac_i ›
act6: suspc_peers ≔ p_s ›
act7: suspc_inst ≔ s_i ›
act8: inst_state ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ inst_state ›
END




s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances 
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
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grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
grd5: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is OK
grd6: susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of 
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_peers(s)∖(suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ 
unav_peers) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_4}) ›
act2: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ›
act3: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set 
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
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grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
act2: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set 
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be 
contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
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grd6: prop = ((run_peers(s) ∖ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) 
∪ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)↦ s))∖unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_DETECT_4})  
›
act2: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
act3: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
act4: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_peers(s) ∖ (unav_peers ∪ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∖ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ›
act3: failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s) ∪ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
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act4: suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_CONFIG_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_IGN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›




grd4: prop = run_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ failr_peers(s) ∪ unav_peers ∪ 
dep_instc(s) not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not 
unavailable and is not already activated for s
grd4: i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
grd5: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
grd6: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
THEN
act1: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd3: card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd4: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: dep_instc(s) ≔ dep_instc(s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ›











grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
grd5: dep_instc(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd6: card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_instc(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd7: prop = run_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{DPL_4}) ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_instc(s) ›
act3: dep_instc(s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
grd4: prop = run_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›




act1: failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s)∖{p} ›
END






grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN



















rect_inst  ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
rctt_inst  ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
actv_instc  ›instances activated by token ownes
inst_state  ›
INVARIANTS
inv1: suspct_peers ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
inv2: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ↦ s ∈ dom(suspct_peers) not 
theorem ›
gluing_susp_1: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = 
suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extended ordinary ›
THEN
act1: run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ InitSuspPrs ›
act3: failr_peers ≔ InitFail ›
act4: dep_instc ≔ InitFail ›
act5: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act6: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act7: suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act8: rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act9: rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act10: actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act11: inst_state ≔ InitStateSrv ›
END




prs  ›Peers that will become unavailable
E  ›Values for token owner per service
WHERE
grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
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grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›the peers in prs are not 
yet unavalaible
grd3: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dom(dom(inst_state) ▷ {srv})
∖prs ≠ ∅  not theorem ›for each service srv, there must always be at least 1 
peer available
grd4: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›Value for token owner 
per service
grd5: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs 
     ⇒ 
     E(srv) = token_owner(srv)    not theorem ›If the token 
owner of a service srv does not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
grd6: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs 
     ⇒ 
     E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ failr_peers
(srv) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) ∧
     E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(inst_state) ∧ E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom
(suspct_peers) ∧
     inst_state(E(srv) ↦ srv) = inst_state(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) ∧
     suspct_peers(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(srv) ↦ srv)  not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes 
unavailable, 
     
                                                                                
A new token owner is chosen: the new token owner must have same characteristics
     
                                                                                
as the previous one (state, list of suspicious neighbours, etc.), and it must
     
                                                                                
not be an unavailable, suspicious, failed peer or a member of prs
WITH
p_s: p_s =  E∼ ◁ suspct_peers ›
rc_s: rc_s = ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rect_inst)  (((E∖token_owner)
∼)×{∅}) ›
s_i: s_i = ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst)  (((E∖token_owner)
∼)×{∅}) ›
rt_s: rt_s = ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rctt_inst)  (((E∖token_owner)
∼)×{∅}) ›
ac_i: ac_i = ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ actv_instc)  (((E∖token_owner)
∼)×{∅}) ›
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become 
unavailable
act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new values for token 
owner per service
act3: rect_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rect_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances 
anymore (1)
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(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances 
anymore (1)
act4: rctt_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rctt_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances 
anymore (2)
act5: actv_instc ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ actv_instc)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not activate instances anymore
act6: suspct_peers ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspct_peers ›the peers 
in prs can not suspect instances anymore (1)
act7: suspc_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not suspect instances anymore (2)
act8: inst_state ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ inst_state ›the peers in 
prs can not monitor the state of the services provided anymore
END




s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances 
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
grd5: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is OK
grd6: susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of 
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_peers(s)∖(suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ 




act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_4}) ›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
act3: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the 
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
act2: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the 
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be 
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grd5: i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be 
contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd7: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
grd6: prop = ((run_peers(s) ∖ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ 
s)) ∪ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)↦ s))∖unav_peers not theorem ›
grd8: susp = suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖rctt_inst
(token_owner(s)↦ s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_DETECT_4})  
›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{susp}) ›
act3: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
act4: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
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grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_peers(s) ∖ (unav_peers ∪ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∖ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ›
act3: failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s) ∪ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
act4: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN











grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_IGN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem 
›
grd4: prop = run_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ failr_peers(s) ∪ unav_peers ∪ 
dep_instc(s) not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not 
unavailable and is not already activated for s
grd4: i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›




grd6: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
THEN
act1: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd3: card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) 
not theorem ›
grd4: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: dep_instc(s) ≔ dep_instc(s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ›
act2: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
grd5: dep_instc(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd6: card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_instc(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd7: prop = run_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{DPL_4}) ›
act2: run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_instc(s) ›











grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
grd4: prop = run_peers(s)∖unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: p ∈ failr_peers(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s)∖{p} ›
END






grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN



















rect_inst  ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
rctt_inst  ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
actv_instc  ›instances activated by token ownes
inst_state  ›
INVARIANTS
inv1: run_inst ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
inv2: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ↦ s ∈ dom(run_inst) not 
theorem ›
gluing_run_1: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = 
run_peers(s) not theorem ›
EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extended ordinary ›
THEN
act1: run_inst ≔ InitRunPeers ›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ InitSuspPrs ›
act3: failr_peers ≔ InitFail ›
act4: dep_instc ≔ InitFail ›
act5: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act6: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act7: suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act8: rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act9: rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act10: actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act11: inst_state ≔ InitStateSrv ›
END




prs  ›Peers that will become unavailable
E  ›Values for token owner per service
WHERE
grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
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grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›the peers in prs are not 
yet unavalaible
grd3: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dom(dom(inst_state) ▷ {srv})
∖prs ≠ ∅  not theorem ›for each service srv, there must always be at least 1 
peer available
grd4: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›Value for token owner 
per service
grd5: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv)    not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv 
does not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
grd6: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs 
     ⇒ 
     E(srv) ∈ run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ 
prs ∪ failr_peers(srv) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) ∧
     E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(inst_state) ∩ dom(suspct_peers) ∩ dom
(run_inst) ∧
     run_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) ∧
     inst_state(E(srv) ↦ srv) = inst_state(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) ∧
     suspct_peers(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(srv) ↦ srv)  not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes 
unavailable, 
     
                                                                                
A new token owner is chosen: the new token owner must have same characteristics
     
                                                                                
as the previous one (state, list of suspicious neighbours, etc.), and it must
     
                                                                                
not be an unavailable, suspicious, failed peer or a member of prs
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become 
unavailable
act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new values for token 
owner per service
act3: rect_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rect_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances 
anymore (1)
act4: rctt_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rctt_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances 
anymore (2)
act5: actv_instc ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ actv_instc)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not activate instances anymore
act6: suspct_peers ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspct_peers ›the peers 
in prs can not suspect instances anymore (1)
act7: suspc_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not suspect instances anymore (2)
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act7: suspc_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not suspect instances anymore (2)
act8: inst_state ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ inst_state ›the peers in 
prs can not monitor the state of the services provided anymore
act9: run_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ run_inst ›
END




s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∩ unav_peers not 
theorem ›instances in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes 
unavailable
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
grd5: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is OK
grd6: susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of 
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖(suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_4}) ›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›








s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the 
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
act2: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the 
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be 
contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 




act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd7: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
grd6: prop = ((run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ∪ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)↦ s))∖unav_peers not theorem ›
grd8: susp = suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖rctt_inst
(token_owner(s)↦ s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_DETECT_4})  
›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{susp}) ›
act3: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
act4: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN











grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ (unav_peers ∪ 
suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ›
act2: run_inst ≔ run_inst  ((prop×{s})×{run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s)∖suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
act3: failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s) ∪ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
act4: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_CONFIG_4}) ›
END









grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_IGN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem 
›
grd4: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i ∉ run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ failr_peers(s) ∪ 
unav_peers ∪ dep_instc(s) not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is 
not unavailable and is not already activated for s
grd4: i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
grd5: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›




grd6: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) 
< min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd3: card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) 
< min_inst(s) not theorem ›
grd4: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: dep_instc(s) ≔ dep_instc(s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ›
act2: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
grd5: dep_instc(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd6: card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s))+card(dep_instc(s)) ≥ 
min_inst(s) not theorem ›
grd7: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{DPL_4}) ›
act2: run_inst ≔ run_inst  ((prop×{s})× {run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ dep_instc(s)}) ›
Page 8
M18
act3: dep_instc(s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
grd4: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: p ∈ failr_peers(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s)∖{p} ›
END






grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN



















rect_inst  ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
rctt_inst  ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
actv_instc  ›instances activated by token ownes
inst_state  ›
INVARIANTS
inv1: failr_inst ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
inv2: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ↦ s ∈ dom(failr_inst) not 
theorem ›
gluing_fail_1: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ failr_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = 
failr_peers(s) not theorem ›
EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extended ordinary ›
THEN
act1: run_inst ≔ InitRunPeers ›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ InitSuspPrs ›
act3: failr_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act4: dep_instc ≔ InitFail ›
act5: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act6: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act7: suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act8: rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act9: rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act10: actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act11: inst_state ≔ InitStateSrv ›
END




prs  ›Peers that will become unavailable
E  ›Values for token owner per service
WHERE
grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
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grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›the peers in prs are not 
yet unavalaible
grd3: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dom(dom(inst_state) ▷ {srv})
∖prs ≠ ∅  not theorem ›for each service srv, there must always be at least 1 
peer available
grd4: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›Value for token owner 
per service
grd5: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv)    not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv 
does not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
grd6: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs 
     ⇒ 
     E(srv) ∈ run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ 
prs ∪ failr_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) 
∧
     E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(inst_state) ∩ dom(suspct_peers) ∩ dom
(run_inst) ∩ dom(failr_inst) ∧
     run_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) ∧
     inst_state(E(srv) ↦ srv) = inst_state(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) ∧
     suspct_peers(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(srv) ↦ srv) ∧
     failr_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = failr_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes unavailable, 
     
                                                                           
A new token owner is chosen: the new token owner must have same characteristics
     
                                                                           
as the previous one (state, list of suspicious neighbours, etc.), and it must
     
                                                                           
not be an unavailable, suspicious, failed peer or a member of prs
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become 
unavailable
act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new values for token 
owner per service
act3: rect_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rect_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances 
anymore (1)
act4: rctt_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rctt_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances 
anymore (2)
act5: actv_instc ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ actv_instc)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not activate instances anymore
act6: suspct_peers ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspct_peers ›the peers 
in prs can not suspect instances anymore (1)
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act6: suspct_peers ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspct_peers ›the peers 
in prs can not suspect instances anymore (1)
act7: suspc_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not suspect instances anymore (2)
act8: inst_state ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ inst_state ›the peers in 
prs can not monitor the state of the services provided anymore
act9: run_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ run_inst ›
act10: failr_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ failr_inst ›
END




s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∩ unav_peers not 
theorem ›instances in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes 
unavailable
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
grd5: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is OK
grd6: susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of 
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖(suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_4}) ›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
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act3: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the 
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
act2: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the 
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be 
contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
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grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd7: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
grd6: prop = ((run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ∪ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)↦ s))∖unav_peers not theorem ›
grd8: susp = suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖rctt_inst
(token_owner(s)↦ s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_DETECT_4})  
›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{susp}) ›
act3: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
act4: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›




grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ (unav_peers ∪ 
suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ›
act2: run_inst ≔ run_inst  ((prop×{s})×{run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s)∖suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
act3: failr_inst ≔ failr_inst   ((prop×{s})× {failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
act4: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_CONFIG_4}) ›
END









grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_IGN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem 
›
grd4: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i ∉ run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers ∪ dep_instc(s) not theorem ›i does not run s, 
is not failed for s, is not unavailable and is not already activated for s
grd4: i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
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grd5: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
grd6: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) 
< min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
END






grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd3: card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) 
< min_inst(s) not theorem ›
grd4: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: dep_instc(s) ≔ dep_instc(s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ›
act2: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
grd5: dep_instc(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd6: card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s))+card(dep_instc(s)) ≥ 
min_inst(s) not theorem ›





act1: inst_state≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{DPL_4}) ›
act2: run_inst ≔ run_inst  ((prop×{s})× {run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ dep_instc(s)}) ›
act3: dep_instc(s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
grd4: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd4: p ∈ failr_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: failr_inst ≔ failr_inst  ((prop×{s})×{failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ {p}}) ›
END






grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
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grd2: p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN



















rect_inst  ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
rctt_inst  ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
actv_instc  ›instances activated by token ownes
inst_state  ›
INVARIANTS
inv1: dep_instcs ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
inv2: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ↦ s ∈ dom(dep_instcs) not 
theorem ›
gluing_act_1: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = 
dep_instc(s) not theorem ›
EVENTSINITIALISATION:  not extended ordinary ›
THEN
act1: run_inst ≔ InitRunPeers ›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ InitSuspPrs ›
act3: failr_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act4: dep_instcs ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act5: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act6: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act7: suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act8: rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act9: rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act10: actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act11: inst_state ≔ InitStateSrv ›
END




prs  ›Peers that will become unavailable
E  ›Values for token owner per service
WHERE
grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
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grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›the peers in prs are not 
yet unavalaible
grd3: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dom(dom(inst_state) ▷ {srv})
∖prs ≠ ∅  not theorem ›for each service srv, there must always be at least 1 
peer available
grd4: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›Value for token owner 
per service
grd5: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv)    not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv 
does not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
grd6: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs 
     ⇒ 
     E(srv) ∈ run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ 
prs ∪ failr_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) 
∧
     E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(inst_state) ∩ dom(suspct_peers) ∩ dom
(run_inst) ∩ dom(failr_inst) ∩ dom(dep_instcs) ∧
     run_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) ∧
     inst_state(E(srv) ↦ srv) = inst_state(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) ∧
     suspct_peers(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(srv) ↦ srv) ∧
     failr_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = failr_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) ∧
     dep_instcs(E(srv) ↦ srv) = dep_instcs(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv)  not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes unavailable, 
     
                                                                            
A new token owner is chosen: the new token owner must have same characteristics
     
                                                                            
as the previous one (state, list of suspicious neighbours, etc.), and it must
     
                                                                            
not be an unavailable, suspicious, failed peer or a member of prs
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become 
unavailable
act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new values for token 
owner per service
act3: rect_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rect_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances 
anymore (1)
act4: rctt_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rctt_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances 
anymore (2)
act5: actv_instc ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ actv_instc)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not activate instances anymore
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act5: actv_instc ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ actv_instc)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not activate instances anymore
act6: suspct_peers ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspct_peers ›the peers 
in prs can not suspect instances anymore (1)
act7: suspc_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not suspect instances anymore (2)
act8: inst_state ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ inst_state ›the peers in 
prs can not monitor the state of the services provided anymore
act9: run_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ run_inst ›
act10: failr_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ failr_inst ›
act11: dep_instcs ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ dep_instcs ›
END




s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∩ unav_peers not 
theorem ›instances in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes 
unavailable
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
grd5: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is OK
grd6: susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of 
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖(suspc_inst




act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_4}) ›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
act3: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the 
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
act2: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the 
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be 
contacted)
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theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be 
contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd7: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
grd6: prop = ((run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ∪ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)↦ s))∖unav_peers not theorem ›
grd8: susp = suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖rctt_inst
(token_owner(s)↦ s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_DETECT_4})  
›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{susp}) ›
act3: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
act4: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›




grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ (unav_peers ∪ 
suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ›
act2: run_inst ≔ run_inst  ((prop×{s})×{run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s)∖suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
act3: failr_inst ≔ failr_inst   ((prop×{s})× {failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
act4: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN











grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_IGN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem 
›
grd4: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i ∉ run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers ∪ dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem 
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grd3: i ∉ run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers ∪ dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem 
›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not unavailable and is not already 
activated for s
grd4: i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
grd5: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
grd6: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) + card(run_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) + card(run_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
grd5: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
grd6: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: dep_instcs ≔ dep_instcs  ((prop×{s})× {dep_instcs
(token_owner(s)↦s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s)↦s)}) ›
act2: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›




grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
grd5: dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd6: card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s))+card(dep_instcs
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
grd7: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{DPL_4}) ›
act2: run_inst ≔ run_inst  ((prop×{s})× {run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
act3: dep_instcs ≔ dep_instcs  ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
grd4: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd4: p ∈ failr_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: failr_inst ≔ failr_inst  ((prop×{s})×{failr_inst










grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN



















rect_inst  ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
rctt_inst  ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
actv_instc  ›instances activated by token ownes
inst_state  ›
INVARIANTS
inv1: dom(run_inst) ⊆ dom(inst_state) not theorem ›
EVENTSINITIALISATION:  extended ordinary ›
THEN
act1: run_inst ≔ InitRunPeers ›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ InitSuspPrs ›
act3: failr_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act4: dep_instcs ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act5: token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
act6: unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
act7: suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act8: rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act9: rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act10: actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
act11: inst_state ≔ InitStateSrv ›
END




prs  ›Peers that will become unavailable
E  ›Values for token owner per service
WHERE
grd1: prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›the peers in prs are not 
yet unavalaible
grd3: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dom(dom(inst_state) ▷ {srv})
∖prs ≠ ∅  not theorem ›for each service srv, there must always be at least 1 
peer available
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∖prs ≠ ∅  not theorem ›for each service srv, there must always be at least 1 
peer available
grd4: E ∈ SERVICES → PEERS not theorem ›Value for token owner 
per service
grd5: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv)    not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv 
does not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
grd6: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs 
     ⇒ 
     E(srv) ∈ run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)∖(unav_peers ∪ 
prs ∪ failr_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) 
∧
     E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(run_inst) ∩ dom(suspct_peers) ∩  dom
(failr_inst) ∩ dom(dep_instcs) ∧
     run_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) ∧
     inst_state(E(srv) ↦ srv) = inst_state(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) ∧
     suspct_peers(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(srv) ↦ srv) ∧
     failr_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = failr_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv) ∧
     dep_instcs(E(srv) ↦ srv) = dep_instcs(token_owner(srv) ↦ 
srv)  not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes unavailable, 
     
                                                                            
A new token owner is chosen: the new token owner must have same characteristics
     
                                                                            
as the previous one (state, list of suspicious neighbours, etc.), and it must
     
                                                                            
not be an unavailable, suspicious, failed peer or a member of prs
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become 
unavailable
act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner  E ›new values for token 
owner per service
act3: rect_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rect_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances 
anymore (1)
act4: rctt_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rctt_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances 
anymore (2)
act5: actv_instc ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ actv_instc)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not activate instances anymore
act6: suspct_peers ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspct_peers ›the peers 
in prs can not suspect instances anymore (1)
act7: suspc_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not suspect instances anymore (2)
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act7: suspc_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst)  
(((E∖token_owner)∼)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not suspect instances anymore (2)
act8: inst_state ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ inst_state ›the peers in 
prs can not monitor the state of the services provided anymore
act9: run_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ run_inst ›
act10: failr_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ failr_inst ›
act11: dep_instcs ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ dep_instcs ›
END




s  ›a service s
susp  ›suspicious instances
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: susp = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∩ unav_peers not 
theorem ›instances in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes 
unavailable
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the 
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
grd5: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is OK
grd6: susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
THEN
act1: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of 
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
grd4: suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖(suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_4}) ›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›








s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the 
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
act2: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the 
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the 
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
grd5: i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not 
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be 
contacted)
grd6: i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token 
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
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grd7: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all 
the suspecious instances of s
THEN
act1: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s) 
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd7: susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
grd6: prop = ((run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ∪ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)↦ s))∖unav_peers not theorem ›
grd8: susp = suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖rctt_inst
(token_owner(s)↦ s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_DETECT_4})  
›
act2: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{susp}) ›
act3: rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
act4: rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›





act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ (unav_peers ∪ 
suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ›
act2: run_inst ≔ run_inst  ((prop×{s})×{run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s)∖suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
act3: failr_inst ≔ failr_inst   ((prop×{s})× {failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
act4: suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers  ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_CONFIG_4}) ›
END









grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_IGN_4}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem 
›
grd4: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state ≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END




s  ›a service s
i  ›an instance i
WHERE
grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: i ∉ run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers ∪ dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem 
›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not unavailable and is not already 
activated for s
grd4: i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
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grd5: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
grd6: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd7: card(dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) + card(run_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
THEN
act1: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not 
theorem ›
grd4: card(dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) + card(run_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
grd5: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
grd6: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: dep_instcs ≔ dep_instcs  ((prop×{s})× {dep_instcs
(token_owner(s)↦s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s)↦s)}) ›
act2: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not 
theorem ›
grd4: actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
grd5: dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
grd6: card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s))+card(dep_instcs
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
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grd6: card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s))+card(dep_instcs
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
grd7: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{DPL_4}) ›
act2: run_inst ≔ run_inst  ((prop×{s})× {run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
act3: dep_instcs ≔ dep_instcs  ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
END







grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
grd4: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: inst_state≔ inst_state  ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
END








grd1: s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
grd2: prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
grd3: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd4: p ∈ failr_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
grd5: prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∖unav_peers not 
theorem ›
THEN
act1: failr_inst ≔ failr_inst  ((prop×{s})×{failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∖ {p}}) ›
END








grd1: p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
grd2: p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∖ {p} ›
END
END
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